AND LAW SCHOOLS TO LEGAL EDUCATION.

with it an assurance to the public that one who has been admitted to the bar is competent, intellectually and morally, to take
charge of the interests which clients may be expected to intrust
to hii. That it is to the very great interest of the public
that admission to the bar should carry with it the strongest
possible assurance of actual fitness on the part of the person
admitted is a remark so evident, so trite, that one hesitates to
write it down, but we sometimes lose sight of the fact that such
assurance can be given through the combined action of the court
and the law schools, and that to do so is a solemn duty which
they owe to the public.
HENRY BUDD.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Texas Court of Appeals.
EX PARTE ASIIER.
The Texas Act, imposing an occupation tax upon traveling merchants
"drummers," or solicitors of trade by sample or othervise, does not contravene the clause of the Feaeial Constitution providing for the regulation of
commerce between the States by Congress.
Bobbins v. Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, disapproved.

ORIGINAL application for writ of habeas corpus to Court of
Appeals.
The opinion states the facts.

John A. .Kirlicks, for ptitioner.
AssistantAttorney- General Davidson, for the State.
WHITE., P. J.-This is an original application to this court
for the writ of habeas copus, in which it is alleged that the
applicant is illegally restrained of his liberty for failure and
refusal to pay a fine of $35 imposed upon him by a justice of
the peace of Harris county, on the charge of pursuing the occupation of a commercial traveler, drummer, or solicitor of trade
by sample, without having paid the occupation tax prescribed
by law on said occupation.
It is admitted that applicant is a citizen of Louisiana, and
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that he did pursue such occupation in Harris county, State of
Texas, without having paid said occupation tax. It is admitted
that the law has been violated, as charged. But it is alleged
that the statute law of the State of Texas, under which petitioner was tried and is restrained in his liberty, is unconstitutional and void, in that it. is in violation of,repugnant to, and
contravenes the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution
of the United States. Thus it will be seen that a direct attack
is made upon the constitutionality of our State law which regulates the matter, and the question of its constitutionality is the
only one to be determined in this proceeding. We find the
statute complained of contained in chapter 17, Gcn. Laws Called
Sess. 17th Leg. pp. 18, 19, et seq, and the particular provision
attacked, which is in part an amendment to article 4665, Rev.
St., reads as follows, viz. :
"From every commercial traveler, drummer, salesman, or
solicitor of trade by sample or otherwise, an annual occupation
tax of $35, payable in advance, provided, that the tax herein
required to be paid by such commercial traveler, drummer,
salesman, or solicitor, shall be paid to the comptroller of public
accounts, whose receipts, under seal, shall be evidence of the
payment of such tax; and provided, further, that no county,
city, or town shall levy or collect any occupation tax upon such
commercial traveler, drummer, salesman, or solicitor: provided,
that nothing herein contained shall apply to any one soliciting
subscriptions for religious, literary, or historical books or maps,
or to persons soliciting for nurseries, newspapers, and gravestones: provided, further, that every commercial traveler, drummer, salesman, or solicitor of trade shall, on demand of the taxcollector of any county of the State, or of any peace officer of
said county, exhibit to such officer the comptroller's receipt
above mentioned; and every commercial traveler, drummer,
salesman, or solicitor of trade who shall fail or refuse to exhibit
said receipt to such officer on demand by him shall be deemed
guilty of misdemeanor, and fined in a sum not less than $25
nor more than $100.'
This is a general law, and an infraction of its provisions is
expressly declared to be a misdemeanor punishable by fine.
Another of our general statutes provides that in misdemeanor
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cases, where a party has been legally tried and fined, he may be
imprisoned in the county jail until said fine and costs are paid;
so that, if the statute iii question be constitutional, a party convicted for its violation may suffer conjointly both fine and imprisonment.
It is urgently contended that this statute is in conflict with
article i, § 8, subd. 3, Const. U. S., which declares that Congress
shall have the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and with the Indian tribes ;"
and we are most confidently cited by counsel for applicant,
in support of this position, to the case of Robbins v. Taxing
District Shelby Co. (recently decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States, March 7, 1887), in which it was,
in substance, held that "a statute imposing a license tax
upon drummers and others selling by sample within a certain
taxing district is a regulation of interstate commerce, and therefore unconstitutional as applied to citizens of other States."
We are free to admit that a majority of the court, in that
case, so held the law to be. We are free to admit that, if the
decision of the majority be correct, it settles the law of this case
in favor of the position assumed for applicant. We are further
free to admit that in all cases involving clearly and unquestionably the constitutionality and validity of State laws with reference to provisions of the Constitution of the United States, the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, clearly,
certainly, and unequivocally expressed upon those questions,
should and ought. to be binding upon the State courts, because
we fully recognize that "'it is essential to the protection of the
national jurisdiction, and to prevent collision between the State
and National authority, that the final decision upon all questions
arising in regard thereto should rest with the courts of the
Union." Cooley, Coast. Linm. (5th ed.) p. 16. But such decisions, no more than the decisions of the State courts, are or
should be binding upon the latter, if in themselves unwarranted
assumptions of constitutional authority-invocations of the Federal power, where such power does not and was never intended
to apply and operate; and, moreover, where said decisions are
directly in conflict with well-adjudicated cases of the same court,
which are not overruled, and which, in addition to their equal
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authority, are based upon fundamental and eternal principles of
reason, justice, and right.
We do not propose to enter upon a discussion anew of the
delicate and important question of interstate commerce-a question so often and so ably discussed in the debates upon the
adoption of the Federal Constitution, when the patent defects of
the Articles of Confederation, intended to be corrected, were
directly present in tile minds and experience of the framers of
that instrument-a question so often discussed, much more ably
than we could possibly hope to do, in the many adjudicated
cases which have come under judicial investigation in the
Supreme, Circuit, and District Courts of the United States,
and courts of last resort in the various States of the Union, as
well as in standard elementary treatises of recognized authority.
On the contrary, we shall content ourselves with simply stating
certain elementary principles of government involving the questions, and then cite the authorities bearing directly upon the
issue presented in this case.
Mr. Cooley, in his work on the Law of Taxation, says: "The
Federal Constitution also provides that Congress shall have power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several States and with the Indian tribes. The Constitution and
the laws made in pursuance thereof, being supreme over the
several States, the power of the regulation cannot be interfered
with, limited, or restrained by any exercise of State authority.
When, therefore, it is held that the power to tax is at the discretionoftheauthority which wieldsit-a power which may becarried
to the extent of an annihilation of that which it taxes, and therefore
may defeat and nullify any authority which may elsewhere exist
for the purpose of protection and preservation-it follows as a
corollary that the several States cannot tax the commerce which
is regulated under the supremacy of Congress. But a tax on
property that may be the subject of commerce under congressional regulation is not a tax on commerce." Page 62. As
to the general power of taxation of business, the learned author
says: "Government may, in the discretion of its legislature,
levy a tax on every species of property within its jurisdiction;
or, on the other hand, it may select any species of property, and
tax that only. The same is true of occupations-government
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may tax one, or it may tax all. There is no restriction upon its
power in this regard, unless one expressly imposed by the Constitution." Id. 384. Again, he says: "A tax on the privilege
of following any particular employment is usually confined to
those which in some particular are exceptional, either because
supposed to be especially profitable, or because they require
special regulations, or because the privilege is in the nature of a
franchise, or because they supply a general demand; so that the
burden imposed will be generally distributed. But no employment is absolutely exempt from the liability to be taxed. The
necessities of the government may require that tile lowest employment, as well as the most lucrative, shall contribute to its
support; and, if any is exempted, motives of policy will govern
the discrimination. When the tax takes the form of a tax on
the privilege of following an employment, convenience in collecting will commonly dictate the requirement of a license, and
the person taxed will be compelled to pay the taxes as a condition to the riglht to carry on the business at all. In such a case
the business carried on without a license will be illegal, and no
recovery can be had upon contracts made in the course of it."
Id. 385.
In his invaluable work on Taxation, Mr. Desty sums up the
doctrine thus: "A law imposing a license tax on transient persons doing business within the State does not violate the provisions of the Federal Constitution. Transient persons selling
goods within the State by wholesale or retail, on land or on
water, are liable to pay a license tax. To authorize a person to
sell foreign merchandise without a license, he must have received it in exchange for articles of his own manufacture or for
productions of his own agriculture. The mere fact that a clerk,
merchant, or other person solicits orders or favors in his business does not necessarily bring him within the law authorizing
a license tax to be imposed upon solicitors. The law means
persons engaged in that particular class of business for a profit
or as a means of livelihood. * * * * A drummer or a
commercial traveler is not a peddler, because he does not carry
with him the goods sold. A State law imposing a license fee
upon merchants who go from place to place soliciting orders is
not unconstitutional as involving a duty or impost on imports,
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or a regulation of commerce, or unequal taxation; it is a legitimate tax oil business." 2 Desty, Tax'n, 1389. 1390.
We will now cite some of the State decisions involving this
question.
In Ward v. Maryland, 31 1ld. 279, it was held "that it is
within the power of the State to tax, in the shape of a license,
any trade, business, or occupation, when carried on in its borders
by those who are not permanent residents of the State, whether
foreigners or citizens of other States; that, even if this law is to
be regarded as restrictive [as to non-residents] and discriminating [in favor of her own citizens] in its character and design, it
still simply imposes a tax on a particular business carried on in
a particular mode within the limits of the State, which it is perfectly competent for the legislature to regulate and restrain."
That case was carried to the Supreme Court of the United States,
and its disposition therein will be noticed hereafter.
In Cole v. Randolph, 31 La. Ann. 535, it was held "that the
law imposing a license tax on transient persons doing business
within the State does not violate that provision of the Constitution of the United States vesting in Congress the exclusive
power to regulate commerce among the several States."
In Sears v. Board Cnn'rs Warren Co., 36 Ind. 267, it was
held that the provision contained in "An Act concerning licenses
to vend foreign merchandise," etc., which required a license fee
to be paid by traveling merchants and peddlers who are not
residents of the State to vend foreign merchandise, is not in conflict with the interstate commerce clause in the Constitution of
the United States.
In Bobbins v. laxing District, 13 Lea 303, it was held that
the law providing that drummers, and all persons not having a
regular licensed house of business in the taxing district, offering
for sale or selling goods, wares, and merchandise therein by
sample, shall be required to pay a specified privilege tax, is constitutional and valid. This case went to the Supreme Court of
the United States, and its reversal is the decison applicant relies
on here.
Let us now cite some of the leading cases decided in the United
States District and Circuit Courts.
In re Rudolph was from the Circuit Court of the District of
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Nevada. It was therein held that a statute of Nevada which
provided that every traveling merchant, agent, or drummer, or
other person selling or offering to sell any goods, wares, or
merchandise of any kind to be delivered at some fhture time, or
carrying samples, and selling or offering to sell goods, wares, or
merchandise of any kind similar to such samples, to be delivered
at some future time, should procure a license, etc., and further
providing that any person pursuing such occupation without
license should be guilty of a misdemeanor, did not violate the
constitutional provisions relative to laying duties or imposts on
imports and interstate commerce. 2 Fed. Rep. 65.
In a most elaborate and well-considered opinion in .Ex parte
Thornion,in theCircuit Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
IUGFES, J., cites and reviews all the leading cases, and his conclusions as stated in the syllabus are: "If the legislature of a
State frames a law relating to merchants and sample merchants,
with the intention to discriminate against non-residents in favor
of residents, and against goods in other States sold by sample in
favor of goods held within the State for sale, and if the legislat;oll has this practical effect, then such provisions are null and
void, and all arrests and prosecutions under them are illegal.
The legislature has the right to discriminate against sample
merchants il favor of merchants, the State being sovereign mistress of her own policy in determining what classes she shall
levy a license tax upon, and what classes she slall exempt from
su(ch taxation, and in deciding how lightly or how heavily she
shall make such tax. The assumption that a merchant is
necessarily a resident, and that a sample merchant is necessarily
a non-resident, is an arbitrary one, and one which a court of
just;-e has no right, by mere inference, to accept as true. It is
only when a law discriminates against a foreign resident of a
certain class, or against the goods held in another State for sale,
in favor of a resident of the same class, and goods held within
the State for sale, that it is obnoxious to the provisions of the
National Constitution in relation to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States, or the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or the
prohibition of laying imposts or duties on exports or imports."
12 Fed. Rep. 539.
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In Jemphis & L. Bd. v. Nolan (Circuit Court, Western District of Tennessee) it was held that "a license or privilege tax
imposed by a State oil the business of an express company, engaged solely in commerce between the States, where there is no
intention by this means to obstruct or prohibit the business, is
not unconstitutional." The learned judge, delivering the opinion, says: "As I read the cases, the principle is that so long as
it is not a direct tax on property carried in the commerce between the States, imposed either on the goods, or indirectly collected from them, and is only a tax on the franchise granted to
the carrier in consideration of' the grant, or, what is the same
thing, a tax or tribute demanded for the privilege of doing the
business, the prohibition of the Constitution does not apply. Of
course, in analogy to our State adjudications, if, under the disguise of taxing a franchise or privilege, the State should undertake by excessive taxation to obstruct or prohibit tile business of
interstate commerce, the constitutional provision would protect
against it." 14 Fed. Rep. 532.
We might cite many other authorities which upon principle
are in alignment with the foregoing, taken from elementary
authors, and from the State and subordinate Federal courts; but
these are sufficient to serve to illustrate the unanimity with which
the question has been settled in so many various tribunals of
standing and ability, inferior to none in the country. Another
fact connected with these decisions is the unanimity and confdence with which they cite and rely upon decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States insupport of the conclusions
they announce. This becomes pa-ssingly singular when the
Bobbins Catse, here relied on, states an entirely different and
contradictory rule; and that, too, without overruling previous
decisions of the same court in diametrical opposition to it.
Let us cite some of these decisions.
In Nathan v. Louisiana, Justice McLEAN says: "Now, the
Federal government can no more regulate the commerce of a
State than a State can regulate the commerce of the Federal
government.

*

*

*

The taxing power of a State is one of

the attributes of sovereignty; and when there has been no compact with the Federal government, or cession of the jurisdiction
for the purposes specified in the Constitution, this power reaches
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all the property and business within the State which are not
properly denominated the means of the general government,
and, as laid down by this court, may be exercised at the discretion of the State. The only restraint is found in the responsibility of the members of the legislature to their constituents. If
this power of taxation by a State within its jurisdiction may be
restricted beyond the limitations stated, on the ground that the
tax may have some indirect bearing on foreign commerce, the
resources of the State may be thereby essentially impaired. But
State power does not rest on a basis so undefinable. Whatever
exists within its territorial limits in the form of property, real
or personal, with the exceptions named, is subject to its laws,
and also numberless enterprises in which its citizens may be
engaged.
These are subjects of State regulation and State
taxation, and there is no Federal power under the Constitution which can impair this exercise of State sovereignty." 8 flow.
73. Same doctrine is declared in City of I.Nzu I-ork v. Miib, 11
Pet. 102.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203, the court, in commenting on inspection laws, uses this language: "They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the
general government, all of which can be most advantageously
exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws
for regulating the internal commerce of a State, are a component part of this mass. * * * No direct general power
over these objects is granted to Congress, and consequently they
remain subject to State legislation." .Se also License Cases, 5
How. 504.
In Ifoodriff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, it was held that "a
uniform tax imposed by a State on all sales made in it, whether
they be made by citizens of it, or citizens of some other State,
and whether the goods sold are the produce of that State enacting
the law, or of some other State, is valid." This doctrine was
reaffirmed in Ilinson v. Lott, Id. 148, where the same State
statute was involved ; and, after discussing the validity of the
statute, that profound jurist, Mr. Justice AxLLEn, concluded his
opinion by saying: "As the effect of the act is such as we have
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described, and it institutes no legislation which discriminates
against the products of sister States, but merely subjects them to
the same rate of taxation which similar articles pay that are
manufactured within the State, we do not see in it an attempt t.
regulate commerce, but an appropriate and legitimate exercise of
the taxing power of the State."
When the case of WVard v. .ltaryland,supra, came before the
Supreme Court, the judgment of the State court was reversed,
and the act declared invalid-not, indeed, as in contravention of
the interstate commerce provision, but because it imposed a discriminating tax upon non-resident traders trading in the limits
mentioned, and that it was pro tanto repugnant to the Federal
Constitution and void. The provision of the Constitution which
was violated was that which guaranteed and secured to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several States (Const., art. iv, § 2). 12 Wall. 418. Mr.
Justice BRA.DLEY alone dissented, he being of opinion that the
act violated the interstate commerce clause, and that it would so
do, "although it imposed upon residents the same burden for
selling goods by sample as is imposed upon non-residents."
In the subsequent case of Osborne v. 3lobile, 16 Wall. 479
(opinion by Chief Justice CHASE), it is said: "It is as important to leave the rightful powers of the State in respect to taxation unimpaired, as to maintain the powers of the Federal
government in their integrity." He further says, speaking of
the decision in the case of State Twr on Railway Gross Receipts,
15 Wall. 284: "The whole court agreed that a tax on business
carried on within the State, and without discrimination between
its citizens and the citizens of other States, might be constitutionally imposed and collected."
These two last cases are directly in point. They were decided
by a unanimous court. They are not overruled in Bobbins v.
Taxing District, relied upon by applicant in this case. They are
directly in conflict with the Robbins Case, and the Bobbins Case
is simply the opinion of a majority, and not of the whole court.
WAITE, C. J., in, to our minds, an unanswerable opinion, concurred in by those profound and eminent jurists, FIELD and
GRAY, dissented from the doctrine announced. Under such circumstances we do not feel bound by the Robbins decision, and,
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not believing it to be the law of this land, we will not consider
it as of binding force upon us.
As conclusive as is to our minds the ablk dissenting opinion
of the chief justice, there are one or more views of the case
which he did not elaborate, and which, in our opinion, should
condemn the doctrine announced.
The strongest position tending to support the doctrine of the
Bobbins Case is, perhaps, that taken in .Brown v. Maryland, 12
Wheat. 419. It was there said: "Any charge on the introduction and incorporation of the articles [of commerce] into and
with the mass of property in the country must be hostile to the
power given to Congress to regulate commerce, since an essential
part of that regulation, and principal object of it, is to prescribe
the regular means of accomplishing that introduction and incorporation." The result of the reasoning in that case was, says
Judge SToRY, "that whatever restrains or prevents the introduction or importation of passengers or goods into the country,
authorized and allowed by Congress, whether in the shape of a tax
or other charge, or whether before or after their arrival in port,
interferes with the exclusive right of Congress to regulate commerce." Dissenting opinion in City of ANew York v. .ililn, 11
Pet. 161. Now for the application of this doctrine to the Bobbins atse. In the opinion of a majority of the court, it is conceded that the Tennessee law is not obnoxious to constitutional
objection, either Federal or State, in so far as citizens of Tennessee are concerned; and that as to them it may be legally and
rigidly enforced--nforced by criminal prosecution, accompanied
with appropriate fines and penalties. In other words, that, as to
citizens of Tennessee, it matters not that the action of the State
may allow them to restrain and prevent the introduction of
goods into the country and be valid, the same action is invalid
as to citizens of other States, merely because they are citizens of
other States. Such doctrine, to say the least of it, is anomalous,
if not paradoxical.
Again, as stated in the beginning of this opinion, our statute
makes it a misdemeanor for a person to pursue the occupation of
a drummer, commercial traveler, or salesmen by sample, without
having first paid a license therefor. To do so is a criminal
offense. In the Bobbins Case, under a law of similar character,
VOL. XXXVI.-12
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it is conceded that the State had the right to pass and enforce
such law against its own citizens. But the startling doctrine is
announced that this same law is invalid and unconstitutional,
and incapable of enforcement as to persons not citizens of the
State, who invade its territority and wantonly violate said law
within its jurisdiction; in other words, that a general law of a
State, penal in character, and violative of neither the Federal nor
State Constitution, is binding upon none save its own citizens.
We have been accustomed to accept as elementary truth the
doctrine that criminal laws are not respecters of persons, nor,
indeed, can be, and that as to them no class of individuals may
claim special immunity. Upon this subject, the Supreme Court
of the United States, in City of New Yorlk v. Miln, emphatically
say: "No one will deny that a State has a right to punish any
individual found within its jurisdiction who shall have committed an offense within its jurisdiction against its criminal laws.
We speak not here of foreign ambassadors, as to whom the
doctrines of public law apply. We suppose it to be equally
clear that a State has as much right to guard by anticipation
against the commission of an offense against its laws, as to inflict
punishment upon the offender after it shall have been committed.
Tie rigid to punish or to prevent crime does in no degree depend
upon the citizenship of the party who is obnoxious to the law."
The Constitution of the United States provides: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." The doctrine of the
Robbins Case goes further. It puts a premium upon non-citizenship, by discriminating in its favor against citizenship, and conferring upon it privileges and immunities which are denied to
the citizens of the State. To such a doctrine we cannot yield
our assent.
In conceding that the Tennessee law was constitutional and
binding as to the citizens of that State, it occurs to us that the
majority opinion in the Bobbins Case virtually and in fact conceded whatever of merit there was in any question involved in
that case on the appeal, and that the concession and conclusion
reached are directly at variance. To nullify such a State law
by judicial action is, in our opinion, to exercise, to say the least,
a doubtful power, if it is not a direct usurpation of unauthor-
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ized power, warranted neither by the letter nor the spirit of the
constitutional provision invoked to sustain it. The fact that
the law may and does affect more citizens of other States than
of the individual State is no criterion by which to judge of its
constitutionality or validity. Whenever her own citizens are or
may be equally affected, we deny that courts of Federal jurisdiction may question the motives of the State legislature in the
passage of the act, much less declare it unconstitutional.
The statute we are construing, and which, in this proceeding,
we are asked to hold unconstitutional, is a general law of equal
application to the entire State, and pro tanto is less objectionable
than the Tennessee law, which applied only to a taxing district.
It would, in our judgmaent, be a strained construction which
would hold this law unconstitutional, within the spirit, much
less the letter, of the provision of the Federal Constitution
regulating commerce between the States.
So believing, we are of opinion that the relator is not illegally
restrained of his liberty by virtue of his conviction and imprisonment for a violation of this law. Ie is therefore remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Harris county; and it
is ordered that applicant pay all the costs incurred in this court
Ordered accordingly.
by reason of this proceeding.
There is much apparent discord
in the adjudications, arising from the
interpretation of the foreign and
interstate commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution: The doctrine
of the principal case is in direct conflict with recent decisions of the
United S:ates Supreme Court, as well
as with late decisions of State courts
of last resort, as will be hereafter
shown.
The Federal Constitution confers
upon Congress the power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with
Art. i, 8, 3d
the Indian tribes.'
par. The point of difficulty seems
to be as to what constitutes such commerce.
A few illustrative cases will be

given. A provision in a State charter to a railroad company that the
company shall pay a bonus on a portion of its earnings to the State from
time to time, is valid, as a State has
power to impose conditions upon its
own grants to corporations: R. B.
Cb. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456. So the
Iowa Act of March23, 1874, to establish reasonable ma imum rates of
charge for the transportation of
freight and passengers on the various
roads within the State is valid, not
being a regulation of interstate commerce: 1R. B. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S.155. See Peik v. B. B. Cb., Id. 164.
But a tax upon the transportation of
passengers may be a tax upon commerce. Hence, a state law which
requires the masters of vessels en-

EX PARTE ASHER.
gaged in foreign commerce to pay a
specified sum to a State officer for
every passenger brought from a foreign country into the State is unconstitutional: Snith v. Turner, 7
How. 233. See M-hy Lung v. Freeman,
92 U. S. 275 ; n re Ah Fong, 13 Am.
L. Reg. 761; 3 Sawy. 144; Henderson
v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U. S. 259. And
a State tax upon the gross receipts of
a. steamship company, incorporated
under its laws, which are derived
from the transportation of persons
ind property by sea between different
States and to and from foreign
countries, is a regulation of interstate
commerce, and thereforevoid: Phila.
Stemship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.
S. 326. This case questions the
decisions of State Freight Tax,
15 Wal. 232. See Indiana v.
Am. Ez. Co., 7 Bias. 227. So a
State statute which levies a tax upon
the gross receipts of a railroad for the
carriage of freight and passengers
into, out of, or through the State, is a
tax upon commerce among the States
and thereforevoid: Fargo v. rwchigan, 121 U. S. 230. See the Beading
B. B. Co.v. Penn., 15 Wall. 232, which
contains a full discussion of this question. So a statute attempting to
regulate the rate of compensation for
transportation of freight from New
York to Peoria, Ill., or from Peoria
to New York, is a regulation of commerce among the States: Wabash
By. Go.v.Illinos,118 U.S. 557. See
Urandallv.Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Carton
v. .11. Cent. B. B., 59 Iowa 148;
Hardy v. A. T. S. F. B. B., 32 Kans.
698.
Laws which require one who
peddles articles grown or manufactured in a 'foreign country to have a
license, is in conflict with 8, art. i,
of U. S. Const, as an attempt to regulate foreign commerce: State v. Pratt
(S. C. Vt., May 28,1887), 4 New Eng.

Rep. 357. So the Missouri statute
prohibiting thc driving or conveying
of any Mexican, Texas, or Indian
cattle into the State, between March
1 and Nov. 1, in each year, involves an attempt to regulate commerce, and is, therefore, void: B. B.
Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S.465.
It also seems to have been a wellestablished test that a tax law or
license law which does not discriminate between different persons engaged in the same calling, between
foreign and domestic corporations,
dealers, producers, and manufacturers of the same class, is not
in derogation of the Constitution
of the United States, simply because it imposes a greater burden
upon one class of tradesmen, producers, manufacturers, or occupations,
than another, as long as it does not
discriminate between persons of the
same class: Machine 0. v. Gage, 100
U. S. 676; Webber v. Virginia, 103 Id.
344; Ezyarte Thornton, 4 llughes, C.
C. 220; s. c. 12 Fed. Rep. 530; In
re Watson, 15 Id. 511, and note;
Brown v. iouston, 114 U.S 622; Walling v. Michigan,116 U. S. 446; Cooley
on Taxation (2d ed.) 99. Thus, in
Ez parte Hanson (D. C. Oregon),
28 Fed. Rep. 127, it was held that an
ordinance of the city of Portland requiring every person who goes from
place to place therein, soliciting the
purchase of goods, without reference
to the place of their product or manufacture, or offering to sell or deliver
the same by sample or otherwise, to
take out a license, does not, on its
face, discriminate against the products
of any State, and therefore it is not a
regulation of commerce, but only a
tax. DEADY, J., said: "A tax or
charge for a license to sell goods is,
in effect, a tax on the goods themselves:" Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.
S. 278. It is now well settled that a
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tax imposedby a State, directly or indirectly, on the products of another
State when brought within its limits,
or offered for sale therein, which, in
effect, discriminates against said products and in favor of the State imposing the tax, is a regulation in
restraint of commerce among the
States, and as such is a usurpation of
the power conferred on Congress by
the Constitution of the United States
Ward v. Md., 12 Wall. 418; Wdlon
v. A1o., 91 U. S. 275; Guy v. Balimore, 100 Id. 43-1; Walling v. .3Mieigan, 116 Id. 446. On the other
hand, where the tax or charge is imposed equally upon the products of the
State imposingit and those introduced
from other States, the law or ordinance imposing the same is not a
regulation of commerce, but only a
legitimate exercise of the taxing
power of the State: Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 133; Mason v. Lott, 8
"Wall. 148: In re Rudolph 6 Sawy.
295; s. c. 2 Fed. Rep. 65; .E parte
.Robinson, 12 Nev. 263. See also
District of Columbia v. .lumason, 2
McArth. 158. And in Ez parte
2Vornton, 4 Hughes C. C. 220; s. c.
12 Fed. Rep. 539, it is said that if a
statute makes no distinction between
resident and non-resident sample
merchants, the lattercannot complain
of a tax. A State levying a tax may
discriminate between different classes
of tradesmen, but cannot directly or
indirectly discriminate in favor of
her own citizens against residents of
other States, nor in favor of goods
held for sale within her own territory against goods held for sale in
other States. Seymour v. State, 51
Ala. 52, seems to be a contrary decision. The State of Alabama passed a
law requiring all persons engaged in
business and professions mentioned
in the act to take outa license. Afterward a law was passed making it

lawful for all persons "to peddle and
sell, without a license, all things
made or manufactured by them" in
the State of Alabama.
The defendant in this case peddled
sewing-machines made in St. Louis,
Mo.. without taking out a license as
provided in the first act. The court
held that the law providing for a
license was binding and that it was
not affected by the subsequent acts,
exempting from a license persodfs
selling manufactured products of Alabama. The court said: "The most
that can be said of the latter enactment is, that it is a law to encourage
manufacturing in this State. * * *
Here there is no discrimination.
Every peddler in the mode mentioned
pays the same license who pays any
license at all" It is apparent that
the law discriminates against goods
of other States, and this decision
seems to stand alone. In Webber v.
Virginia, 103 U. S. 344, the law of
Virginia requires agents for the sale
of manufactured articles of other
States to obtain a license to sell the
same, for which a specific tax was required to be paid for each county in
which a sale or offer of sale was made,
but it did not require such license to
be obtained by agents selling articlds
manufactured in Virginia if the agent
acted for the manufacturer. In holding the law unconstitutional, -the
"
court said (p. 350): IIere there is a
clear discrimination in favor of home
manufacturers and against manufacturers of other States. Sales by maliufacturers are effected chiefly through
agents. A tax upon their agents
while thus engaged is, therefore, a
tax upon them, and if this is made
to depend upon the foreign character
of the articles, that is, upon their
having been manufactured without
the State, it is to that extent a regulation of commerce in the articles
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between the States. It matters not
whether the tax is laid directly upon
the articles sold or in the form of license for sale:'
Welton v. .iEisour4
91 U. S. 275, and County of M3obile v.
Kimball, 102 Id. 691, cited and approved.
"A license fee exacted from dealers
in goods not produced or manufactured in the State, before they can be
sold from place to place wi~hin the
State, is a tax upon the goods themselves, and inadmissible when no such
fee is exacted from those who deal in
goods produced or manufactured
within the State:" Cooley on Taxation (2d ed., 93. To same effect is
State v. McGinnis, 37 Ark. 362. See
Baker v. State, 44 Id. 134; New
Home Sewing Machine Co. v. Flcher,

Id. 139.
In Spe-er v. Commonwealth, 23 Gratt.
(Va.) 936, it was held that a State
statute requiring a license to be obtained by every person selling goods
by sample who was not a "resident
merchant," does not discriminate in
favor of citizens of the State, for the
reason that a man may be a resident
citizen and not a resident merchant,
and vice versa.
But the recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court modifies
this doctrine in its application to traveling merchants, agents, and drummers soliciting orders and customers
by sample: Bobbins v. Shelby Taxing
District,120 U. 6. 489. In this case
plaintiff in error was engaged in
Memphis, Tennessee, in soliciting sale
of goods of a Cincinnati, Ohio, firm,
dealers in paper and other articles of
stationery, and exhibiting samples
for the purpose of effecting such sales
-s--an employment usually denominated as that of a "drummer."
There
was, at the time the sales were made,
a statute in force, applicable to the
district, which provided that "all

drummers, and all persons not having
a regular licensed house of business
in the taxing district, offering for
sale or selling goods, wares or merchandise therein, by sample, shall be
required to pay the sum of ten dollars a week or twenty-five dollars per
month for such privilege, and no license shall be issued for a longer
period than three months.' It was
made a misdemeanor to violate the
statute. Stats. Tenn., ISSI, c. 96,
S16. Plaintiff in error was convicted
by the trial court to pay a fine, w'hich
judgment was affirmed by the State
Supreme Court: 13 Lea 303.
The question of the case, as stated
by the Supreme Court, was "Whether
it is competent for a State to levy a
tax or impose any other restrictions
upon the citizens or inhabitants of
other States, for selling or seeking to
sell their goods in such State before
they are introduced therein." The
court remarked: "To say that such a
tax is not a burden upon interstate
commerce, is to speak at least unadvisedly and without due attention to
the truth of things."
The principles established by this
case are: 1. That the Constitution
having given to Congress the power to
regulate commerce among the several
States, that power is necessarily exclusive; the failure of Congress to
make express regulations indicates its
will that the subject shall be left free
from any restrictions, and that any
regulation of the subject by the States
is repugnant to such freedom. 2. The
only way in which commerce between
the States can be legitimatery affected by State laws is when, by virtue of its police power and its jurisdiction over persons and property
within its limits, it provides for the
security of life and property, or imposes taxes upon persons residing
within the State, or belonging to its
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population, or upon avocations pursued therein, not directly connected
with foreign or interstate commerce.
BRADLEY, J., proceeds: "But in making such internal regulations, a State
minnot impose taxes upon persons
passing through the State or coming
into it merely for a temporary purpose, especially if connected with interstate or foreign commerce; nor
can it impose such taxes upon property imported into the State from
abroad or from another State, and not
yet become part of the common mass
of property therein; and no discrimination can be made by any such
regulation adversely to the persons or
property of other States; and no regulation can ba made directly affecting
interstate commeree. Any taxation or
regulation of the latter character
would be an unauthorized interference with the power given to Congress over the subject."
The contention in the principal
case, that to so hold is discriminating
against domestic citizens, is well
answered in this case: "To say that
the tax," says BRADLEY, J., "if invalid as against drummers of other
States, operates as a discrimination
against drummers of Tennessee,
against whom it is conceded to be
valid, is no argnmelit, because the
State is not bound to tax its own
drummers, and if it does so whilst
having no power to tax those of other
States, it acts of its own free will and
is itself the author of such discrimination."
WAITE, C. J., and FIELD and
GRAY, J.J., dissented on the ground
that the license was in effect a tax on
business, and as there was no di3crimination between citizens of Tennessee
and other States, the law was valid,
citing Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 4S1.
The Bobbins Case has been cited and
approved in Corsoa v. Maryland, 120

U. S. 502, 505; Fargo v. Mich., 121
Id. 230, 210; Oaachila Packet Co. v.
Aikn, 121 Id. 444, 417; PIhlda.

Steamship Co. v. Penna., 122 U. S.
320, 330; Western U. Td. 0). v. Pendleton, 122 Id. 347, 357.
In COrson v. Maryland, 120 IL S.
502, it was held that the law of Maryland, which provided that "no person or corporation other than the
grower, maker, or manufacturer shall
barter or sell, or otherwise dispose of
or shall offer for sale any goods, chattels, wares, or merchandise within this
State, without first obtaining license
in the manner prescribed," etc., is unconstitutional as applied to a drummer for a New York house, being an
attempt to regulate commerce among
the States.
The Bobbins Case has been approved in very recent State decisions.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in

Simmons Hardware Co. v. .McGuire
(S. C. La. June, 18S7), bases its decision upon the Bobbins Case. Ilere
the plaintiffs were domiciled and
doing business in St. Louis, Mo., and
in the prosecution of the same they
imported their goods and wares into
Louisiana for sale, in unbroken packages, through their traveling agents
or drummers, who visited the State
soliciting orders and customers and
making sales by samples. The Louisiana law provided that "all traveling agents offering any species of
merchandise in this State for sale, or
selling by sample or otherwise, shall
pay ***
a license of fifty dollars,"
etc. This was held to be an attempt
to regulate commerce between the
States, therefore repugnant to the
Federal Constitution, and so far as
such traveling agents as may represent principals domiciled in other
States areconcerned, tbetax is nulland
void. It will be observed that the layt
contained no discriminating feature..
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The Supreme Court of Nevada, in
the very late case of Ex parte Posenblatt (1s87), also follows the Robbins
Chse. Here the petitioner was a traveling salesman or drummer, taking
orders and selling goods for his principal, a California house. The act of
Nevada made it a misdemeanor to
exercise such occupation without
having first obtained a license therefor. lie was convicted in the lower
court, and upon habeas corpus was discharged by the Supreme Court. After
commenting upon the Bobbins Case,
the court observed: "The statute of

Tennessee and that of this State do
not materially differ. Neither imposes a tax upon citizens of other States
that does not equally apply to its
own citizens, nor is there any discrimination in either statute against
other States or their products. The
principles of the decision of the Supreme Court in the BRobbins Case must
be accepted as establishing the unconstitutionality of the statute under
which the petitioner was convicted."
EuGS.

McQu Lu.
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Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
BEVERLIN v. DEVERLIN.
Common-law marriages when contracted in this State are not recognized by
our courts as valid.
No marriage contracted in this State is valid when it affirmatively appears
that it has not been solemnized according to the requirements of our statutes
on that subject, although the parties may thereafter have ,ssociated and cohabited together as husband and wife.

and supersedeas from Circuit Court, Taylor County.
Bill for divorce. The opinion states the case.

APPEAL

John "W.Mason and B. F. Martin, for appellant.
S. P. McCormick, for appellee.
S&-ii-DR, J.-Suit in equity, instituted November 20, 1884,
by Elizabeth Beverlin against Israel A. Beverlin, in the Circuit
Court of Taylor county, for a divorce a mensa et thoro, and for
alimony. In the original bill the plaintiff alleged that she was
lawfully married to the defendant in the State of Pennsylvania,
in June, 1861 ; that at that time she was a widow, and her name
was Elizabeth Foster, and that from the date of said marriage
until October, 1884, she and the defendant lived, associated, and
cohabited with each other as husband and wife; that in October, 1884, the defendant, by his harsh, cruel, and inhuman
treatment, compelled her to abandon home and children, and
has since refused to permit her to return, etc.
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In April, 1885, the defendant filed his answer to said bill,
denying that he and the plaintiff had ever been married, and
averred that in June, 1861, the plaintiff had a lawful husband,
one Edward Foster, living in Belmont county, Ohio, and that
at the time of the alleged marriage with defendant she had
a suit pending for a divorce from said Foster in the Court of
Common Pleas of said Belmont county, which was afterward
dismissed at her costs; that said Foster continued to be the
husband of the plaintiff until October 31, 1873, when he
died.
In July, 1885, the plaintiff filed an amended bill in which
she repeats that she had been married to the defendant at the
time and place stated in her original bill, and, by way of amendment, she avers that in the fall of 1873 she learned that one
Edward' Foster had recently died in Belmont county, and she
thereupon conferred with the defendant as to the possibility of
said Foster being her former husband and the probable effect
on their marriage, and the action, if any, they should take in
relation thereto. The bill then avers that " finally, for prudential reasons, it was determined to take no public action; but
that plaintiff and defendant would, and they did, mutually consent and agree to, and did, reaffirm their former marriage, and
became and continued to be what, in truth and in fact, they had
been theretofore, husband and wife ; and that thereafter, and from
day of October, 1884,
that day henceforth, to and until the at the town of Grafton, State of West Virginia, she was and continued to be the wife of defendant, living and cohabiting with
him as such, performing all the duties of a devoted wife, and
he, the defendant, so holding the plaintiff out to all persons as
such, and representing to all persons with whom plaintiff and
defendant were acquainted that plaintiff was his wife, as in
fact she was."
The depositions fully prove that the plaintiff and defendant
lived together, cohabitated, associated, and represented themselves as husband and wife for over twenty years, and that during that time they kept house together, and four children were
born to them, two of whom are still living. It is also clearly
proved that in June, 1861, at the time the plaintiff alleges she
was married to the defendant, the plaintiff was a married
VoI. XXXVI.-13
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woman and the wife of Edward Foster; that both she and the
defendant knew this fhct; and that she continued to be the wife
of said Foster until his death, which occurred October 31,1873.
There is no testimony in regard to the alleged marriage set up
in the amended bill as having taken place in 1873, after the
death of the plaintiff's husband, Edward Foster, except the
deposition of the plaintiff herself. In her first deposition,
taken before the filing of her amended bill, the plaintiff testifies
that she was married to the defendant June 9, 1861, in West
Alexander, Pennsylvania, before a justice whose name she does
not remember; that she had never been married to tile defendant at any other time; that her former husband, Edward Foster, was then dead, and had died long before; that she had
seven children by said Foster; and that he had died about thirtytwo years ago. In her deposition taken after the filing of her
amended bill, the plaintiff testifies that in 1873 she visited the
State of Ohio, where she had formerly resided, and on
her return home to Grafton she informed the defendant that she
had heard her former husband, Edward Foster, had died in
Ohio a short time before, and that then she and the defendant
"chad a talk as to whether it was necessary that we should
marry again. le said that it was legal, and that we need not
marry again; that we will go on as we have been, doing the
best we can for our children, as long as life shall last.." And
then, in an answer to the question, "Did you talk over and
agree as to how you should be and live in the future?" she says:
"We lived together just as we had been, as man and wife. I
was to be his wife, and he my husband, as long as life should
last." This is the whole of the evidence in support of the alleged marriage of 1873.
The testimony of the defendant was not taken, but he, in his
answer to the amended bill, denies positively that lie ever made
any statement or agreement such as asserted by the plaintiff, or
that he ever pretended or admitted to her that she was his wife
or he her husband, as both of them well knew that such was
not the faet.
The Circuit Court in its final decree, entered April 1, 1886,
decided in fivor of the plaintiff, awarding her a divorce a memsa
d thoro from the defendant, and requiring him to pay to her
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$250 annually for her support. From this decree the defendant has appealed.
The first question to be considered is whether or not any
marriage ever took place or existed between the plaintiff and
defendant. If there was no marriage, or none is shown by
proofs, then, as a matter of course, the decree of the Circuit
It is
Court must be reversed and the plaintiff's bill dismissed-.
distinctly proved, both by the depositions and documentary evidence, that the plaintiff was on January 25, 1838, formally
and legally married to Edward Foster, in Belmont county, in
the State of Ohio; that she lived and cohabited with said Foster
as her husband from that time until about the year 1859, and
had issue-from seven to ten children-by that marriage; that
she knew Foster was living at the time of her alleged marriage
in June, 1861, with the defendant, and that said Foster continued to be her legal husband until his death, in October, 1873.
It is consequently impossible that the alleged marriage of June
9, 1861, could have taken place, or been lawful in any respect.
The question of marriage, therefore, depends entirely upon the
allegations of the amended bill, and the testimony in support of
them. Both the facts alleged and the proofs to sustain theni
have been before fully stated. It is insisted for the appellee
these show a valid common-law marriage, and that such marriage, under the circumstances in this case, is valid and sufficient
in this State.
There is much controversy as to what constitutes a valid
common-law marriage. It always has been and still is a doubtful question in England: Beg. v. Millis, 10 Clark & F. 531; 1
Bish. Mfar. & Div., §§ 270, 278. In the American States where
such marriages have been recognized and held valid there is
considerable diversity as to their requisites. In North Carolina,
Tennessee, Massachusetts, Maine, and Maryland some ceremony
or celebration seems to be necessary to a valid common-law marriage, and in most or all of these States it has been questioned
whether or not the statutes have not superseded common-law
marriages, and that a marriage, to be valid, must be in conformity with the statutes: State v. Samud, 2 Dev. & B. 177 ; Grisham
v. State, 2 Yerg. 589; Com. v.111unson. 127 Mass. 459; State v.
Hodgskins, 19 Me. 155; Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, 379.
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The rule is fully as liberal, if not more so, in New York and
Pennsylvania, than it is in any of the other States. In New
York it has been held that no religious form or ceremony of
any kind is essential to validity of the marriage. All that is
requisite in that State is that the parties should be capable of
contracting, and that they should actually contract to be man
and wife; but such contract must be proved to the satisfaction of
the court, and may be proved by the wife when her testimony
is corroborated and entitled to credit: Bissell v. Bissell, 55
Barb. 325; Van Tzyl v. Van Tayl, 57 Id. 235. In Pennsylvania it has been decided that" marriage is, in law, a civil contract, not requiring any particular form of solemnization before
officers of church or State, but must be evidenced by words in the
present tense, uttered for the purpose of establishing the relation of husband and wife, and should be proved by the signature of the parties or by witnesses present when it is made.
Therefore, when the evidence of the contract was the declaration of the wife that, ' about thirty-one years since, she went to
the house of A. S., to live with and keep house for him, under
a mutual promise and agreement that they would sustain toward each other the relation of husband and wife, and that
they did thus live and cohabit together,' it was held that there
was not proof of a marriage in fact :" Com. v. Stump, 53 Pa.
St. 132. I have been unable to find any case in which the
courts of Virginia or of this State have ever held that a common-law marriage was valid. This is certainly persuasive evidence that such marriages have never been regarded as valid in
these States.
Referring to the facts in this case, it does not seem to me
that they are sufficient to prove a marriage according to the
liberal rule adopted in the States of New York and Pennsylvania. Before any pretense of a legal marriage the parties
had lived and cohabited together for over twelve years. It is a
well-settled rule of law everywhere that a cohabitation, illicit in
its origin, is presumeI to be of that character unless the contrary 153 proved, and cannot be transformed into matrimony by
evidence which falls short of the fact of an actual contract of
marriage. Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but
they must be such as to exclude the inference or presumption
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that the former relation continued, and must satisfactorily prove
that it had been changed into that of actual matrimony by
mutual consent: Foster v. Hawley, 8 Hun 68; Williams v.
Williams, 46 Wis. 464; Appeal of Reading F.Ins. & Trust Co.,
23 Cent. Law J. 472; Hantz v. Scaly, 6 Bin. 405.
In the case before us the testimony of the pretended wife is
contradictory, and so unsatisfactory as to render it extremely
improbable and unreliable. But if we admit its credibility, it
falls far short of establishing any actual contract of marriage.
It simply proves the continuance of the illicit association and
cohabitation which is shown to have existed between the parties,
without interruption, for over twelve years before the alleged
marriage. The plaintiff simply says that she and the defendant
did not deem it necessary to marry again, as they considered
their former illegal marriage legal, and that they thereafter
lived together just as they lad been doing, as man and wife.
There is no semblance of a change in their relations or actual
agreement of marriage shown here, and this is all the evidence
we have of the alleged marriage. But, in the view this court
takes of the law, it is unnecessary to rest our decision upon the
conclusion just indicated. We think our statute has wholly
superseded the common law, and in effect, if not in express
terms, renders invalid all attempted marriages contracted in
this State which have not been solemnized in compliance with
its provisions. The statute in force in this State in 1873, when
it is alleged the marriage now in question occurred, is embraced
in chapter 63, Code 1868. The first section of said chapter
provides for the issuance'of marriage licenses; the third, fourth,
and fifth sections, by whom, and the manner in which, marriages may be solemnized; and the sixth section is as follows:
"Every marriage inthis State shall be under a license, and solemnized in the manner herein provided ; but no marriage solemnized by any person professing to be authorized to solemnize
the same shall be deemed or adjudged to be void, nor shall the
validity thereof be in any way affected, on account of any want
of authority in such person, if the marriage be in all other
respects lawful, and be consummated with a full belief on the
part of the persons so married, or either of them, that they
have been lawfully joined in marriage; nor shall any marriage
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celebrated within this State between the 17th day of April,
1861, and the 1st day of January, 1866, be void by reason of
the same having been solemnized without such license."
While it is true statutes regulating marriages have generally
and properly been construed as directory, and not mandatory,
since marriage is a natural right, and one that existed independent of statutes, any commands which a statute may give concerning its solemnization should, if the form of words will
permit, be interpreted as mere directions to the officers of the
law and to the parties, not rendering void what is done i,, disregard thereof Consequently, the doctrine has become established, as a general rule, that a marriage good at common law
will be held valid, notwithstanding the existence of any statute
on the subject, unless the statute contains express words of nullity. This rule, however, is not universal: 1 Bish. Mar. &
Div., § 283. It seems to me, therefore, that when the terms of
the statute are such that they cannot be made effective, to the
extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without interpreting the statute as mandatory, then such
interpretation should be given to it. The statute under consideration, in express words, declares that "every marriage in this
State shall be under a license, and be solemnized in the manner
It is possible that these words standing
herein provided."
alone, should, under the general rule just state', be interpreted
as merely directory. But the statute does not stop here. It
qualifies these words by provisions which would be wholly useless and unnecessary if it were intended and should be held that
the preceding provisions are simply directory. It is declared
that certain marriages shall not " be deemed or adjudgedvoid "
because the person solemnizing them did not in fact have authority to do so. It also declares that certain other marriages
shall not "be void" because they were solemnized without a
license. These exceptions or qualifying provisions seem to me
to be equivalent to an express declaration that marriages had in
this State, contrary to the commands of the statute, and not
saved by the exceptions, shall be treated as void. It is apparent that the legislature must have interpreted the statute as
making the excepted marriages null and void without the excepting clauses, for otherwise the exceptions would be useless,
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and would not have been made. The introduction of the exemptions is necessary, exclusive of all other independent, extrinsic exceptions.

The maxim is clear, "expressum facit cessare

taciturn," affirmative specification excludes implication : Potter's
Dwar. St. 221; Cates v. Knight, 3 Term R. 442.
It is therefore my conclusion that no marriage, or attempted
marriage, if it took place in this State, can be held valid here,
unless it has been shown to have been solemnized according to
our statutes. It is very certain, it seems to me, that no attempted
or pretended marriage can be held valid when it affirmatively
appears that it has not been so solemnized. There is no pretense.
that the pretended marriage sought to be established in this case
was solemnized in any respect according to the requirement of
the statute. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the plaintiff
and defendant in this case never were legally married, and that
the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed in her bill. I
have come to this conclusion with less regret because, by the
express command of our statute, "the issue of marriage deemed
null in law, or dissolved by a court, shall nevertheless be legitimate." Section 7, e.78, Code, p. 485; Stones v. Keeling, 5
Call. 143 ; Rice v. Efford, 3 Hen. & M. 228.
For the reasons stated, the decree of the Circuit Court must
be reversed, and the plaintiff's bill dismissed.
JOHNSON, GREEN, and WooI)s, JJ., concurred.
In Richard v. Brehm, 73 Pa. St. 140,
the court said: " Marriage is a civil
contract jure ge tium., to the validity
of which the consent of parties able
to contract is all that is required by
natural or public law. If the contract
is made per verba de presenti, though it
is not consummated by cohabitation,
or if it be made per terba defuturo and
be followed by consummation, it
amounts t(. a valid marriage in the
absence of all civil regulations to the
contrary."
It is believed that the foregoing is
a correct statement of the common
law of marriage as recognized by the
weight of authority: 2 Kent. Com.
87; 1 Black. Com. 439.

1. Marriageper verba de presenti.According to the weight of authority,
the present consent to take each other
as husband and wife seems to have
been sufficient to constitute marriage
at common law. This consent may
be expressed verbally or in writing,
with or without witnesses or some
person authorized to solemnize the
marriage, without any particular form
or ceremony, and may be proved as
any other contract: Stew. 1U. & D.,
84 et aeq.
"It is a present and perfect consent,
the which alone maketh matrimony
without either public solemnization
or carnal copulation, for neither is
the one nor the other the essence of

BEVEIRLIN v. BEVERLIN.
matrimony, by consent only :" Swinburne Est., 4.
"The only difference between a
marriage celebrated by a formal ceremony and one not so celebrated is,
that in the former case the regular
celebration is conclusive evidence of
the mutual consent requisite to the
validity of the marriage, while in the
latter it is competent to rebut the
proof of the marriage by other evidence e' Clayton v. Wardell, 4 N. Y.
230.
Cohabitation does not appear to
have been essential to the validity of
marriage per verbta de presenti: Clayton v. Wrardell, 4 N. Y. 230; Dumaresly v. Fishly,3 A. K. Marsh. 368;
2 Bish. M. & D., J 223. Contra,
Floyd v. Calvert, 53 Miss. 37 ; Taylor
v. State, 52 Id. 84. See also Cartwrizh v. .cGown, S. Ct. Ill. June 17,
1887. It is said to have been necessary
by the law of Scotland: 2 Parr. Cont.
(7th ed.) 75.
"On the other hand, it is not sufficient to agree to present cohabitation
and a future regular marriage when
more convenient, or when a wife die,
or when a ceremony can be performed.
* * * To constitute marriage the
consent must not be attended by an
agreement that some intervening
thing shall be done before the marriage takes effect, as that it be publicly
solemnized e' GlrtwriVht v. .cGoun,
S. C. 111. June 17, 1887 ; Stew. M. &
D. 86; 2 Bish. M.&. D. 249; Carmichael v. State, 12 0. St. 553.
2. .llustrations.-In Bissell v. Bissell, 55 Barb. 424, "He placed the
ring upon her finger stating, ' This is
your wedding ring; we are married.'
She received the ring as a wedding
ring. He then said: 'We are married just as much as Charles is to his
wife' (referring to his brother and
sister-in-law). ' I will live with you
and take care of you all the days of

my life as my wife.'" Her assent to
this was held to constitute a valid
marriage.
In Hantz v. Sealy, 6 Binn. (Pa.)
405, the defendant said: " I take you
(the plaintiff) for my wife," and the
plaintiff being told that if she would
say the same thing the marriage
would be complete, answered, "To be
sure, he is my husband good enough."
Now these words of the woman do
not constitute a present contract, but
allude to the past contract which she
always asserted to be a lawful marriage. This holding seems at this
distance too literal for the ordinary
requirements of life.
In a recent Michigan case, Clancy
v. Clancy, S. C. Mich., June 9, 1887,
marriage was claimed by virtue of
cohabitation under the following
agreement:
"DF-orr, March 24, 1886.
"An article of agreement made and
entered into by and between Mrs.
Mary McCarthy, of Chicago, Illinois,
and Dennis Clancy, of Detroit, Michigan. We mutually and jointly, from
now, henceforth and forever, agree to
live as man and wife, but each party
retain the right to buy, sell, and transfer their respective properties without
question of the other party.
Ma. 1ARY McCA.RTHY.
"DxNis CLaxcy.
"Witness: Hugh Murray.
"Emma Murray.!
This was held to constitute an
agreement for illicit cohabitation and
not for marriage. But see the dissenting opinion of MonsE, J.
3. -blarriage per verba de prescndt
approved.-The doctrine that no celebration was necessary to the validity
of marriage at common law has been
approved in Alabama, California,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
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Mississippi, Missouri, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee,
and by the courts of the United
States: Cases cited by respective States
below.
No celebration is necessary by the
law of nature: Richard v. Brehm, 73
Pa. St. 140. Or by the civil law:
Hidlett v. collim?, 10 flow. 174. Or
by the law of Scotland: Dalrymplev.
.Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Const. 54; J1fcAdam v. Malker, 1 Dow. 148. Or by
the Canon Law previous to the Council of Trent: Patton v. Philadelphia,
1 La. Ann. 98.
4. Marriage per rerba de presenti
dliapprovel.-On the other hand, the
courts of "Maryland, Massachusetts,
and North Carolina have declared
marriage per verbsa de presenti, as well
as per rerba,de futuro cum copula to be
imperfect at common law until celebrated in facie eccleshe-not conferring
rights of property upon the parties or
legitimacy upon their children, but
only the right to compel a specific
performance of the marriage contract
in a spiritual court. See cases cited
below.
This is the view finally sustained
by the English courts. In Queen v.
Millis, 10 Clark & Fr. 534, the discussion fills 374 pages, and the court
was equally divided in opinion. This
case has been ably criticised by Mr.
275)
Bishop (2 Bish. It. & D.,
and in Canada (Breakey v. Breakey, 2
U. C. [Q. B ] 349). It has been followed, however, by the later English
cases: Bcamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L.
Cas. 274; Cathcrwood v. Casloa, 13 M.
& W. 261.
See Wigmore's Case, 2
Salk. 438; King v. Brampton, 10 East.
282; Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Ilagg.
C.R.79.
5. Marriageper verbsa de faturo cam
copua.-In Duncan v. Duncan, 10 0.
St. 181, the court said: "The idea
that a contract for a future marriage
VOL. XXXVI.-14

followed by cohabitation as husband
and wife, is itself a valid marriage at
common law, seems to have obtained
currency on the credit of remarks
made by several elementary writers of
distinguished learning and ability
and by certain judges of high character, speaking by way of obiter dicta
in cases in which this question was
really in no way involved. But the
better opinion now seems to be that
these remarks are unsupported by any
case actually adjudicated and entitled
to be considered as authoritative, and
that such a contract never was a good
marriage at common law, either in
this country or in England, and the
mistaken doctrine seems to have originated either in the inadvertent confounding of what might, in the absence of rebutting evidence, be good
presumptive evidence of marriage
with marriage itself; or from the fact
that such a contract per verbsa defuturo.
followed by cohabitation, was one of
which the Canon Law, as administered by Ecclesiastical Courts in England until restrained by statute, would
enforce specific performance."
In ihsney v. Arnold, 15 N. Y. 345,
the court said: "The principle that
a promise followed by intercourse was
in some sense a marriage was a branch
of the ecclesiastical system, resulting
from the acknowledged jurisdiction of
the ecclesiastical courts to compel the
performance of such marriages by
spiritual censure. Having dispensed
with that jurisdiction, we cannot consistently acknowledge any marriage
to be valid which requires the intervention of a spiritual court to make it
perfect. We must insist upon those
circumstances which the law requires
in an executed contract upon any
other subject. 'Mutual promises to
marry in future are executory, and
whatever indiscretions the parties may
commit after making such promises,
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they do not become husband and wife
until they have actually given themselves to each other in that relation'
However, the authority of numerous elementary writers and jurists is
found in support of the doctrine that
a good common law marriage may be
contracted per verba defuturo cuam copula: 2 Kent Com. 87; 2 Greenl.
Ev.
460; 1 Bouv. Inst. 110; Starr
v. Peck, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 270; Dumaresly v. FMsly, 3 A. K. Marsh. 369;
Teter v. Teter, 88 Ind. 494; Askew v.
Dupree, 38 Ga. 173; Est. -ifCauslandc,
62 Cal. 568; Cartwrlght v. MeGown
S. Ct. Ill., June 17, 1887. See also
Patton v. Philaddphia,1 La. Ann. 98.
The question does not seem to be
one of great difficulty when we consider that "the copula is presumed
[only] to have been allowed on the
faith of the marriage promise, and
that so the parties at the time of the
copula accepted of each other as
man and wife;" which presumption
may be rebutted. "If the woman in
surrendering her person is conscious
that she is committing an act of fornication instead of consummating her
marriage, the copula cannot be connected with any previous promise
that has been made and marriage is
not thereby constituted :" Postv. Post,
70 I1. 484; lebblethwaite v. Hepworth,
cfcGown,
98 Id. 123; Cartwright v.
Supra.
The copula must be in fulfillment
of the agreement to marry or in consummation of such a contract. The
fact that sexual intercourse occurs
after an agreement to marry at some
future day is not of itself sufficient to
establish the marriage relation. To
be availing, the parties at the time of
copula must THEN accept each other
as husband and wife: Stoltz v. Doering, 112 Ill. 234; Peck v. Peck, 12
R. I. 485; Borth v. Valk, Dud. Eq.

(S. C.) 212; Fryer v. Fryer, Rich. E q.
Gas. (S. C.) 85.
Thus understood, marriage per
verba de futuro cum copula becomes
really marriage by present consent,
and the term one of convenience
simply.
6. Effect of Statutes on the subj, ct
-e ebration not necessary.-It is a
well-established rule in this country
that a marriage good at common law
is good notwithstanding the existence
of any statute on the subject, unless
the statute contains express words of
nullity. It is said by Lord STOWELL
in his celebrated judgment in the case
of Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg.
0. R. 54, that "marriage in its origin
is a contract of natural law; it may
exist between two individuals of different sexes, although no third person
exiqted in the world, as happened in
the case of the common ancestors of
mankind. It is the parent, not the
child, of civil society. In civil society
it becomes a civil contract regulated
and prescribed by law and endowed
with civil consequences. * * * If
it should be said that positive legislation is a substitute for the rule, then
this positive legislation, like the rule,
should in its terms be restrictive of
the natural right and not merely
directory as to the mode of its exercise. If it be not restrictive in its
terms, then the rule of construction
founded on the serious and evil consequences that must generally result
from declaring invalid the exercise of
the right will apply :" Carmichadv.
State, 12 0. St. 553; Duncan v. Duncan, 10 Id. 181.
This rule has been adopted and
no celebration is required to render a
marriage valid in:
Ohio.-Supra.
Albarma.-Dickerson v. Brown, 49
Ala. 357 ; Campbell v. Gullatt, 43 Id.
57; Statev.-ilurphy, 6 Id. 765.
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California.-REst. ReCaasland, 52
Cal. 568; Graham v. .Bennett, 2 Id.
503; Est. Titeomb, MNyr. Prob. (Csl.)
55.
Georgia.-Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga.
173.
Illiaois.-Cartwrightv. MAcGou, S.
C. Ill., June 17, 1887; Hebblethwaite v. lepworh, 98 111.126; Post v.
Post, 70 Id. 434.
Iowa.-M11'cFarlandv. McFarland,51
Ia. 565 ; Blanchard v. Lambert, 43 Id.
228.
Louisiana.-Blasini v. Sue. Blasini,
30 La. Ann. 1388; Sac. of Hubee, 20
Id. 07; Ilolmes v. Holmes, 6 Id. 463;
Pattonv. Philadelphia,1 Id. 68.
.richigan.-Iatc ins v. Kimmel, 31
Miich. 127; Clancy v. Clancy, S. C.
Mfich., June 9, 1887; Meister v. Moore,
96 U. S. 76; Peet v. Peet, 52 Mich.
464.
3finnesola.-Statev. Worthington, 23
Minn. 528.
.,1ississippi.-Hargoves v. Thompson, 31 Mliss. 211; Ruandle v. Pegram,
49 Id. 751; Floyd v. Cdrert,53 Id. 37.
Missouri.- Dyer v. Brannock, 66
M%1o.
391; .Boyer v. Dihry,58 Id. 510.
Xetw Hampshire. - Londonderry v.
Chester, 2. N. II. 263. But see Dunbartonv. Franklin, 19 Id. 257.
X'ew York.--ynes v. MeDermott,
01 N. Y. 451; Hayes v. .People,23 Id.
390; anjolle v. Ferric, 23 Id. 90;
Cheney v. Arnold, 15 Id. 345; Glayton
v. Wardell, 4 Id. 230; Van Tayl v.
Van Tayl, 57 Barb. 235; Bissell v.
Bissell, 55 Id. 323; In re Taylor, 9
Pai. 611; Rose v. Clark, 8 Id. 574;
Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52; Davisv.
Davis, 1 Abb. N. C. 140; Starr v.
Peck, 1 Hill 270; O'Gara v. Eisenlohr, 33 N. Y. 296.
Pemnsylvania. - Commonwealth v.
Stump, 53 Pa. St. 132; .st. Brice, 11
Phila. (Pa.) 98; ITantz v. Sealey, 6
Binn. (Pa.) 405.
South Carolina.-Davenportv. Culd-

well, 10 S. C. 317; State v. Whaley,
10 Id. 500; Fryer v. Fryer, Rich.
Eq. Cas. (S. C.) 85; North v. 1radk,
Dud. Eq. (S. C.) 212.
lWisconin.-lWilliams v. Williams,
46 Wis. 464; s. c. 32 Am. Rep. 722.
This rule also obtains in the Fed.
eral courts: .eister v. M1oore, 96 U.
S. 76; flolabird v. Mat. Lf. Ins. Co., 2
Dill. (C. 0.) 167; s. c., 12 Am. L.
Reg. (N. S.) 566; M1athewsar, v,
Phenix Iron Foundry, 20 Fed. Rep.
281; Jewell v. Tewell, 1 How. 218; Tatterson v. Gaines, 6 Id. 550. But see
Holmes v. Holmes, 1 Abb. C. C. 523.
7. Celebration lNecesary.-In other
States, the statutory requirements
must be followed or tihe marriage is
void. In Denison v. Denison, 33 Md.
360, the court said: "It is true the
act contains no express prohibition
or declaration of absolute nullity of
marr.age contracted per verba de presenti,but it is plainly to be perceived
that such marriages if allowed would
contravene the spirit and policy of
the act. The implications from the
provisions of the act are exceedingly
strong against such marriages, and
the practice and custom of the people
of the State have been so universally
in conformity with what would appear to have been the policy and requirement of the law, that such custom has acquired the force and sanction of law; even though a question
couldbe made as to the technical construction of the act itself. Besides,
as we have seen, an unsolemnized corttract of marriage at the common law
is inchoate merely or incomplete, being ineffectual to confer many of the
most important rights of the nmtrimonial state, and to supply the defect of solemnization positive law was
required. Such positive law has been
provided, and consequently a marriage contracted in this State merely
per verba de presenii or per verba de

BEVERLIN v. BEVERLIN.
futuro cuam copula has no sanction in
our law, whatever may be the law
upon this subject elsewhere." See
also Classen v. Classen, 57 Md. 510.
But see Cheseldine v. Brewer, 1 H. &
McH. 152.
Substantially the same rule prevails and a celebration is necessary
in:
Kentucky.-By statute, Estill v.
Rogers, 1 Bush. 62 ; but not otherwise,
Dumaresly v. .Fishby,3 A. K. Marsh.
368; Donnelly v. Donnelly, 8 B. Mon.
113.
_assachusetts. - Commonwealth v.
.Munson, 127 Mass. 459; Thompson v.
9hompson, 114 Id. 566; .M1ilford v.
Worcester, 7 Id. 48. But see Parton v.
Herrey, 7 Gray 119.
E~orth Carolina.--Cooke v. Cooke,
Phil. L. (N. C.) 583; State v. Samuel,
2 Dev.&B. (N. C.)177. ButseeState
v.Ta-cha-na-tah, 64N. C. 614.
Tennesme.-Bashaw v. State, 1
Yerg. 177; Grisham v. State, 2 Id.
588. But see Andrews v. Page, 3
Heisk. 653, 657.
8. Open Question.-The question
has not been adjudicated or the law
is still unsettled in Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado,Dakota,Florida, idaho, .lfontana, Nebraska, Nevada, New .3exico,
Utah. Trirginia, and Wyoming.
Connecticut Kbe v. Antram, 4
Conn. 134; Goshen v. Stonington, Id.
209;
Delaware.- (Celebration probably
necessary.) Pettyjohn v. Pettgiohn, I
Houst. (Del) 332;

Indiana.-Teter v. Teter, 88 Ind
494;
Kansas.-Stale v. l1al~ker, 26 Am.
L. Reg. 455 ;
11aine. - ( Celebration probably
necessary.) State v. Ilodgskins, 19 Me.
155; Cram v. Burnham, 5 Id. 213;
Brunswick v. Litchfield, 2 Id. 28;
.New Jersey.-(Celebration probably
not necessary.) Goldbeck v. Goldbeck,
18 N. J. Eq. 42; Pearson v. Howey, 11
N. J.L.12;
Orcgon.-Celebration said to be
necessary in Holmes v. Holmes, 1 Abb.
C. C. 525, but this case has been overruled as to California, and is of
doubtful authority;
Rhode Island.-(Probablyno celebration necessary.) Peck v..Peck, 12
R. I. 485; J1attleison v. Plwnix
Iron Foundry, 20 Fed. Eep. 281.
Texas.-(Celebration necessary by
Mexican law and probably by present
law.) Rice v. Rice, 31 Tex. 174;
Sapp v. Newsom, 27 Id. 537; Lewis v.
Ames, 44 Id. 319;
nermont.-Xewbury v. Brunswick, 2
1,t. 151; State v. Rood, 12 Id. 396;
-N'orthfield v. Plymouth, 20 Id. 582.
The fact that the party solemnizing
a marriage is not properly authorized
will not prevent itsbeing a good common-law marriage: Carmichadv.State,
12 0. St. 553; People v. Girdler, S. C.
Mich., Feb. 10, 1887; Patterson v.
Gaines, 6 How. 550.
CHAs A. ROBIS.
Lincoln, Neb.
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New York Court of Appeals.
MOORS v. KIDDER ET AL.
S., a dealer in drugs in Boston, obtained, through K., P. & Co., agents for
13. Bros. &Co., London, a letter of credit directed to C. C. 1. & Co., Calcutta,
S.s agent for the purchase of drugs, authorizing him to draw upon B. Bros.
& Co" to the extent of £3,0O0 for goods purchased on account of 3., B. Bros.
& Co's agency to have bills of exchange to that amount, if accompanied by
bills of lading of the goods, filled up to the order of B. Bros. & Co. In his
acceptance of this letter of credit, S. agreed that" all property which shall be
purchased by means of the within credit * * *
together with the bills of
lading for the same, are hereby pledged and hypothecated to B. Bros. & Co. as
collateral security" for the payment of the bills drawn against the credit,
"and shall ba held subject to their order on demand, with authority to take
possession and dispose of the same at discretion fortheir security or reimbursement: Held, that the title to goods purchased by C. C.B. & Co. on the strength
of the credit and shipped, the bill of lading being fille.l up to the order of
B. Bros. & Co. in accordance with the terms of the letter of credit, was ia B.
Bros. & Co, and that they were not mere pledgees of the goods.
One intrusted with the bills of lading for the purpose of warehousing the
goods in the name of the owner, is not intrusted with documents of title for
the purpose of sale or procuring advances within the meaning of the New
York factors' act.
APPEL from general term, Supreme Court, First Department.
Action brought by Joseph B. Moors against Kidder, Peabody
& Co., Baring Bros. & Co., and John B. Hobby, Sons & Co., to
recover the possession of a quantity of shellac.

One Swain, a dealer in drups, etc., in Boston, for some years
bad been in the habit of purchasing merchandise through his
agents, Bancroft & Co., of Calcutta, who bought the merchandise on Swain's account, and p-id for it, when purchased, by
drafts drawn on Barin; Bro. & 0.). agminst the merchandise
under letters of credit issued to Swain by Baring Bros. & Co.
through Kidder, Peabody & Co., their American agents. The
letter under which the goods here in dispute were purchased
was as follows:
"KIDDER,

PEABODY

& Co., 40 STATE STREET,
BOSTO'N, August 3, 1881.

"Mtessrs.

.

. Baacroft & Co., Calcutta-DEAr Sins : You

are hereby authorized to value on Messrs. Baring Bros. & Co.,

MOORS v. KIDDER ET AL.

London, for account of Paul M. Swain, Esq., Boston, Mass.
by bills at three (3) months' sight for the cost of any shipment,
of goods via San Francisco and thence overland, or at three (3)
to six (6) months' sight for the cost of goods by any other route,
direct, or under through bills of lading to Boston or New York,
to the extent of three thousand pounds sterling (say £3,000 stg.),
and we hereby agree with the drawers, indorsers, and bona fide
holders, respectively, of' the bills drawn by virtue of this credit,
that the same shall ba duly honored by Messrs. Baring Bros. &
Co., upon presentation at their banking-house in London, if
drawn and negotiated within six (6) months from this date, and
if accompanied by bills of lading for such goods filled up to the
order of Messrs. Baring Bros. & Co., and by invoice of the same
to their order for the account of whom it may concern.
"A duplicate of such invoices, with consular certificate
attached, together with one bill of lading, to be sent direct to us
either by vessel or mail.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servants,
[Signed]
" KIDDER, PEABODY & CO."
In his acceptance of tie letters Swain agrees that "all property which shall be purchased by means of the within credit,
* * * together with the bills of lading for the same, are
hereby pledged and hypotlecated to Messrs. Biring Bros. &
Co. as collateral security" for the payment of the bills drawn
against the credit, "and shall b3 held subject to their order on
demand, with authority to take possession and dispose of the
same at discretion for their security or reimbursement."
After the arrival of the goods at. New York, Swain called at
the office of Kidder, Peabody & Co., who had possession of the
shipping papers, and from whom Swain had before obtained the
shipping papers of other goods, and asked for the papers. When
asked what he was going to do with them, lie said he wanted to
enter them at the custom-house and warehouse them for account
of Baring Bros. & Co. Oa getting the papers, he gave them a
receipt, stating that "such invoice and bill of lading are delivered to me for the purpose of enabling me to enter the goods referred to in them at the custom-house, and I hereby agree to
place the goods in storage for Messrs. B.iring Bros. & Co."
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Swain entered the goods at the custom-house in the name of
his broker, who warehoused them and gave the warehouse receipt to Swain, who then pledged it, with other receipts, etc., to
the plaintiff for a loan. Kidder, Peabody & Co. and Baring
Bros. & Co. took possession of the property and stored it
with Hobby, Sons & Co., and the plaintiff thereupon brought
this action.
. R. Robinson, for appellant.
Chas. B. Alexander, for respondents.
FiNcHi, J.-The entire argument of the appellant turns upon
the proposition that Swain was the general owner of the shellac and the Barings merely pledgees. Upon that assumption
the argument runs smoothly to its conclusion, and encounters no
serious obstacle. But the grave trouble is in the assumption itself and tihe authorities which clash with it. The general subject was very thoroughly discussed in Farmers' & 2llechanics'
Nat. Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 573, and whether the doctrine
there declared covers the facts now presented, and whether they
have or do not have vital distinguishing features, are the real
subjects for our consideration. The doctrine stated was, in substance, that where a commercial correspondent, however set in
motion by a principal for whom he acts, advances his own
money or credit for the purchase of property, and takes the bill
of lading in his own name, looking to such property as the reliable and safe means of reimbursement up to the moment when
the original principal shall pay the purchase price, he becomes
the owner of the property instead of its pledgee, and his relation
to the original mover in the transaction is that of an owner under a contract to sell and deliver when the purchase price is
paid. The authorities which sustain, and the reasons which
justify, the doctrine need not be repeated, and it is required only
that we determine whether it applies to and settles the ease in
hand.
There are some facts in the cited case which are not in this,
and there are some in this which were not present in that, and
to these and their effect attention must be directed. In that case
the purchase was made by the brokers or agents of him who, as
the ultimate vendee, may be termed conveniently, if somewhat
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inaccurately, the principal. Such brokers wer.. b:v'crs aml sellers
on coiliission, and, it is said, were the commercial correspond-

ents to whomn the rule reLj,'s, and who needed and received its
protection, while here the only commercial correspondents were
Bancroft & Co., at (alcutta, woi are not before the court and
whose rights are not in question. But Bancroft & Co. were the
sellers, and not the buyers, of the shellac, in their relation to the
parties concerned. They passed their title either to the Barings
or Swain, and while they were commercial corrcspondents in
some sense, they were not such within the rule underdiscussion,
for they advanced nothing on the credit of the property, and
parted with title instead of taking it. The Barings, although
bankers, were equally commercial correspondents, and they took
title through the bill of lading and bought the property on their
own credit. But if Bancroft & Co. be treatedl as the commercial correspondents, the case is not changed. Like Sars & Daw
in the Logan Case, they bought the shellac on their own credit,
or with their own money, and g,)t reilnl)ursement by drawing
upon the Barings, transferring title to them by the invoice and
bill of lading to their order, as Sears & Dav did to the discounting banker in the Logan Case. The difference in the manner of
making the advances is not material. Iu each case the bankers
become owners or pledgees.
lIn the Logan Case the purchasing correspondent took from
the vendor a bill of sale as well as a bill of lading to his own
order, but the Barings took only the bill of lading if the invoice
to their order was not tantamount to a bill of sale. We do not
deem that difference, if it was one, at all material. The title
passed as effectually by the latter paper alone as if it had been
preceded by the former, for we have uniformly held that the
bill of lading is the evidence of title, and is sufficient to vest
the ownership and absolute control in him to whose order it is
drawn. The purchase in the case cited seems to have preceded
the shipment so as to make natural and convenient a bill of sale
covering the interim. If it had been intended in this case to
vest the general ownership in Swain and make him the purchaser, a bill of sale to him, or an invoice to his order, might
naturally have been made, but as to the Barings the purchase
and the shipment were practically coincident.
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In the cited case, again, the bill of lading, as attached to and
sent fbrward with the discounted draft, had stamped upon it a
statement addressed to the original principal that the wheat and
the insurance of it were pledged to the plaintiff as security for
tile payment of the draft, and that the wheat was put into his
custody in trust for that purpose, not to be diverted to any
other use until the draft was paid, and that, upon his accepting
and paying the draft, the claim of the plaintiff would cease. This
appears to have been an effort to put in words upon the bill of
lading the legal meaning of the transaction. It was not necessary to the certainty or scope of that legal meaning, and
amounted only to a precaution. A similar distinction was
sought to be drawn in the cited case itself between it and Bank
of Toledo v. Shaw, 61 N. Y. 283, and 69 N. Y. 624. In that
the bill of lading was, when forwarded, accompanied by a letter
explicitly directing the property to be delivered only upon payment of the specified purchase-money. The comment of the
court in tile -Logan Ca.se was
Such agreement was but putting
into terms the legal effect of the transaction in the case before
us; for we have shown by authority that the taking of the bill
of lading in the name of the plaintiff for its account and the
discount of the draft by it on the strength thereof did transfer to
it the title to the wheat." Indeed, it seems to me that the title
of tile then plaintiff was rather weakened than strengthened by
the matter stamped upon the bill of lading, for it speaks of the
transaction as a pledge, when in truth it was an ownership, and
it appears to be for that reason that the court, in upholding the
banker's title, founded on the bill of lading, speak of the latter
"even with the modification thereof made by the matter stamped
upon it," and "even as modified." So that the absence of the
special indorsement in the case at bar at least does not weaken
the bearing of the Logan Case upon it.
But a much more important suggestion made by the appellant
is founded upon the terms of the written agreement between
Swain and Kidder, Peabody & Co. as agents of the Barings,
which was intended to govern and control the entire transaction.
They issued a letter of credit addressed to Bancroft & Co., and
authorizing them, for account of Swain, to value on the Barings
by bills for X3,000, and promised to accept and pay those bills
."
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"
acco mpanied by bills of lading foir such goo(is filled l to
the order of Messrs. Baring Bros. & (o., and by invoice of the
same to their order br account of whoiii itmay cocern." Swain
on his part agreed to provide funds in London to in et such
bills as should be drawni at their maturity, and that "all property whic.h shall be purchased by mcans of the within credit,
together with the bills of lading f;,r
the same, are hereby pledged
and hypo,)thecated to Meisrs. Baring Bros. & Co. as collateral
seeurity for tile payment as -a)ove promised, and shall be held
su.ject to their order on denand, with authority to take possessio,, and dispose of the same at discretion for their security and
reimbursement." The argument upon this provision rests Upon
the words "pledged and hypothecated" and "collateral security,"
and avers, as a consequence, that Swain was, within the contemplation of the parties, general owner of the shellac, and the Barings merely pledgees. It is oi)servable that Sw'ain (lid not so
understand it, for in his testinimny he said: "Kidder, Peabody
& Co. were the owners of these goods till they arrived in
Boston." It has already been mentioned that a similar expression
was used by the plaintiff in tile Loqan Gse in the matter stamped
upon the bill of lading describing the wheat as "pledged" to

the plaintiff, and as "secarity"

for the payment of the draft;

and so little did the nse of the inapt words afF&t the plain and
unequivocal sullstance of the transaction in the mind of time
court, that the use of the word " pledgedl" was not even made the
subject of remark. It is further quite evident that, from the
moment of the shipment and the delivery of tile bill of lading,
the absolute jawi disponenadi was in Kidder, Peabody & Co. by
the very ternis of' Svaiu's agreement. They were at liberty to
"dispose" of the property "at discretion," and eitier for
"security" or reimbursement. It is also to be noted that what
is spoken of as "pledged" is not merely the goods or the property, but the bills of lading also. These documents carry the
title as well as the right of possession, and the pledge or hypothecation is expressly applied to both. The meaning assuredly was
that the title should pass. Very likely, as is suggested for the
defendant, tile transfer was rather in the nature of a mortgage

in which the title pases than in that of a pledge in which the
pledgeor is general owner. Here, then, we have a case where
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no title was attempted to be given to Swain, where it was given
to the Barings by the bill of lading to them, wher6 they paid
for the property by their own credit and money, where it was
the very pith of the adventure that the shellac should furnish
the means of meeting the price, where the invoice was to be
made to their order, where the possession was to be theirs, where
they were to have the right of disposal at discretion, and Swain
was to have no control until the payment of the draft. In such
a case he could not be general owner, and an inference to that
effect from an inapt expression cannot be indulged. So far, the
ease, in our judgment, cannot be distinguished from that against
Logan, upon the authority and reasoning of which the Barings
must be deemed owners, and not merely pledgees.
The settlement of that point disposes of the case as affected by
the factors' acts of this State and Massachusetts, except in a
single respect. It is not pretended that plaintiff is protected
under the provision which makes the transfer by an agent
intrusted with the evidence of title, and which has been made
upon "the faith thereof," valid under some circumstances, even
against the real owner; for the bill of lading, with its indorsement, was not shown to the plaintiff and in no manner affected
his action. But the appellant insists that there was evidence
enough to go to the jury that Swain was intrusted with the
property for the purpose of a sale, or of obtaining advances
upon it, and so, under the factors' act, the plaintiff's title as

pledgee is to be-protected. The course of business brought the
shellac to the custom-house and into the "general order" stores.
From that custody it could only be removed by some action of

ICidder, Peabody & Co. by force of their bill of lading. Swain
applied for the papers to Mr. Collins, who was their merchandise clerk, and who testifies: "I asked what he was going to do
with the papers, and he said he wanted to enter them at
the custom-house and warehouse them for account of Baring
Bros. & Co." Collins repeated that request to Peabody, who
gave his consent. Thereupon Swain signed a receipt for the
papers, which specifies explicitly this one sole purpose for which
they were put in his control, and thereupon they were indorsed
in blank to enable Swain to make the entry, and to warehouse
the goods as agreed. Instead of doing that, Swain entered them
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in the name of his broker, and then pledged them to plaintiff as
security for a loan, the pledgee trusting to the representations of
Swain and the warehouse receipt which he obtained. Peabody,
so fhr as lie was a party to the occurrence, fully corroborates
Swain, and the latter was not thereafter called to deny, and did
not deny, their version of the transaction. All that was later
shown in rebuttal was a copy of the complaint in an action
begun by Kidder, Peabody & Co. against Swain and Casey, who
was tie warelousenlan.
The opinion of the general term shows
so fully that the statements of that complaint taken together
were in no Inauner inconsistent with- the evidence given for thie
defense as to make a repetition needless; and we may confine
our attention to the evidence of Swain and what it is claimed to
establish.
Invariably the manner of dealing between the parties was
like that developed in this ease, so fhr as the written agreements
were concerned. These were in two forms: One of them, that
which we have described, which intrusted the shipping papers
to Swain solely that he might enter and warehouse the goods in
the name of the Barings; and the other, which recited their
sale and gave them into the custody of Swain, to make delivery,
and collect the proceeds, which were stipulated to "belong" to the
Barings and to be handed over to them. Swain could not name
a single instance in which one or the other of these papers was
not signed by him, but it was sought to show by him that the
action under them was loose, and he was permitted to act differently. Ile said that lie had been in the labit of entering the
goods sometimes in his own name, a,,d of selling or pledging
the goods, and paying the proceeds long after, to meet the drafts
maturing in London. Under the second form of receipt a sale
was eontemlflate(] and payment of proceeds over to Kidder,
Peabody & Co.; and that they did not demand them immediately upon the sale, and often accepted them later, although in
time for the drafts, shows simply their confidence in Swain, but
(lid not make their money his, and serves sufficiently to explain
Peabody's alleged admission that Swain had been permitted to
do as lie pleased. And it is noticeable that the one single instance in which Swain says he can remember the facts of the
deviation from the written stipulation was one under the
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second form of receipt, in which, after a sale, he did not deliver
over the proceeds promptly upon obtaining them. But he
admits that he never had any consent to warehouse the
goods in any other name than that of the Barings, and, out of
thirty-four instances in which the papers were put ini evidence,
Swain, with the aid of the books, was able to name but four instances in which he warehoused in his own name and pledged the
goods. He does not pretend that the fact came to the knowi-edge of Kidder, Peabody & Co., and any such knowledge is
denied by them. The argument here is that they must have
known, and the jury might have found that they did know.
Our opinion is with that of the courts below, that such a finding would not have been warranted. All that Swain's evidence
tends to show is that iii transactions under form No. 1 he often
did not at once turn over the warehouse receipts, and was not
questioned about them, and in transactions under form No. 2
was not immediately called upon for the proceeds received.
There was not enough to destroy the force and work a modification in the written stipulations of the parties, and no verdict to
that effect would have been justified.
The judgment should be affirmed with costs.
(All concur, except RAPALLO, EARL, and PECKHAM, JJ.,
dissenting.)
The principal case turns upon the
question whether Baring Bros. &
Co. had title to the goods or were
merely pledgees. The fact that a
bill of lading is made out in the name
of any person is some evidence of
title to the goods in such person.
It is, however, by no means concIusive evidence. As between vendor
and vendee (or factor and principal),
the fact tlat a vendor shipping goods
to his vendee takes out the bill of
lading in his own nmme is very
strong evidence that the vendor did
not intend to vest title in the vendee
by the shipment. Thus, in Turner v.
Trustees, 6 Exch. 543, it was held that
where an agent purchases goods with
his own funds and puts them on

board a ship of the principal and
takes a bill of lading to his own order
which states that the goods are to be
carried free of freight, being the
-goods of the owner, the property in
the goods does not pass to the principal by mere shipment of the goods.
Where an agent buys goods on his
own credit, but in behalfoflhisprincipal, and ships them to his principal,
taking out the bill of lading in his
own name, the presumption is nearly
conclusive that title did not pass:
Je.nkyns v. Brown, 14 Q. B. 496;
Forehieimer v. Stewart, 65 Iowa 593;
Forty S cks of Wool, 14 Fed. R. 643.
Where the bill of lading is taken
out in the name of the ve:ndee, there
is a presumption that title to the
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goods has thereby passed to him:
Joes v. Sim, 6 Post. (Ala.) 138.
In Ellenhan v. Maguire,6 Exch. 570,
it was held that title did not pass to
the vendee by shipment of the goods,
where the vendor took the bill oflading in his own nane, although the
vendee had partly paid for the goods
and had made arrangements to complete the payment.

Similarly it was held in Holmes v.
Gemmaa Security Bank, that where the
vendor attaches the bill of lading to
a draft as security for its payment, and
transfers the draft for value, the title
to the goods does not pass to the vendee although the vendor is indebted
to the vendeeat the time for previous
advances : lIimcs ct al. v. German Security Bank, 87 Pa. St. 525.
But the presumption that title remains in the vendor if he take the
bill of la ling in his own name, although a very strong one, may nevertheless be rebutted. Where thereare
any facts tending to rebut the effect
of the bill of lading., the question
whether title has or has not passed
must be pa.-.d upon by the jury:

Dows et al. v. atioalExchange Bank,
91 U. S. 618.
In lL (n ts1,el v. Booker, 2 Ex. 691,
it was held that a bill of lading,
though made out in the name of the
consignor, may really be taken by.
him as agent for the consignee. This
is fact for thejury. If not taken as
agent the con-ignor must indorse the
bill before title will pass to the consignee.
When the bill of lading is taken
out in the name of some third person
who discounts a draft drawn on the
vendee, the title does not pass to
the vendee until he pays the draft:
Seymour v. -Yorton, 105 Mass. 272.
When the bill of lading is made
out in the name of a third person advancing money for the goods or dis-

counting a draft on the vendee, it
isclear that the sail third person has
some interest in the goods: I1ciskill
v. Farmers and Xechanics' Nat. Bank,
89 Pa. St. 155. But whether lie has
title or a mere pledge is doubtful and
probably depends upon the circumstances of the ase. In Rarmterd and
Mecamnics' .at. Bank v. Logan, 74 N.
Y. 568, it was held that a bank advancing money to the vendor, taking
as security a draft drawn to its order
on the vendee and a bill of lading of
the goods made to its account and
order, acquired title to the g ,ods.
These cases seemi to sh,,w that the
form of the bill of lading is by no
means conclusive as to the ttle to the
billed goods. In this view it seenis
very difficult to su.ttain the decision
in the principal case. The letters of
Swa in to Kidder, Peabody & Co. state
expressly that the " property which
slall be purelha-ed by means of the
** together with
written credit *
the bills of lading for the same, are
hereby pledged and hypothecated to
Messrs. Baring Bros. & Co. as collateral security," which seems to show,
beyond question, that the go (1s were
to be pledged and not conveyed to
Baring Bros. &. (%). The court rely
upon the case of 1-hr,.s' aul Medianics' National Bank v. Logan, 71 N. Y.
568. But that cae is entirely different from the principal case in this
respect. In that case a principal in
New York ordered goods of a factor
in Buffalo without proriditq faunds
with which to purchase them. The factor accordingly made arrangements
with a Bulllo bank, by which it advanced the money to pay for the
goods and took a draft o:, the principal and the bill of lading of the
goods made out to its order and account. It was held that the title to
the goods was in the bank. In that
case, the fact that the bill of lading
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was not in the name of the principal
showed conclusively that the title to
the goods was not in him. It must
then either be in the factor or in the
bank. The factor had no reason to
retain title to the goods, except to secure himself for the piice of them,

hence when the bank advanced the
price of the goods there was every
reason to suppose that the factor intended to transfer title to the bank by
having the bill of lading made out to
it. In the principal case the factor
was supplied with funds by the prin-

cipal by means of the arrangement
through Kidder, Peabody & Co. with
Baring Bros. & Co., and consequently
had no interest in what disposition
should be made of the title to the
goods. The title to the goods should
be controlled by the terms of the arrangement of Swain with Kidder,
Peabody & Co., which seems expres
to the effect that the goods were to be
merely pledged to Baring Bros. & Co.
L. C. GRF-xxx.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
NOYES v. TOWN OF BOSCAWEN.
One who is injured while riding in another's carriage, by invitation of the
latter, caused by a defective highway, is not chargeable with the owner's negligence
RESERVED case

from Merrimack county; CARPENTER, Judge,

presiding.
Case, under the statute, for an injury received from a defective highway. Mrs. Noyes, the plaintiff, about nine o'clock in
the evening of October 10, 188.5, was riding with one Dearborn,
who drove the horse, when the right wheel of the carriage struck
a stone, the defect complained of, and the plaintiff was thrown
out and broke her arm.
The plaintiff was a witness, and was asked whether she considered Dearborn a careful driver. On the defendant's objection,
the question was excluded, subject to exception. The plaintiff
requested the court to instruct the jury that Dearborn's negligence could not affect the plaintiff's right to recover unless he
was her agent, and either under her control or controlled her
personal conduct. The court denied this request, subject to exception, and instructed the jury that if, at the time and place of
the accident, the highway was not reasonably safe and suitable
for the travel thereon, and both the plaintiff and Dearborn exer-
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cised ordiarv care, the plaintiff might recover ; that ifa person
of average prudence, placed in exactly the situation in which
)earborn and the l)aintilf were immediately before and at tile
time of the accident, 1)osses~ed of the same knowledge and means
of knowledge which they had of all the surrounding circumstances, would or might have done %s they did, they exercised
ordinary care anl were free from fault ; that if either Dearborn
or the plaintilt'did not exercise ordinary care, and by such care
the plaintiff would have escaped injury, the verdict should be for
the defendant. Verdict for defendant.
. F. Dudleyi, for plaintiff.

IV. G. Btxloa an.I (Jhase & Streeter, for defendant.
CLARI .J.-The case raises the question whether a person
who is guilty of no personal negligence, receiving an injury while
riding in the earriage of another, caused by a defect in the
highway and the carelessness of the driver, over whom he has
no control, is prevented by the negligence of the driver from
recovering agaiinst the town whether the negligence of the
driver of a carriage is a defense to an action brought by a passenger, personally free from fault, for the recovery of damages
for all injury 1al)penlinug from a defective highway. Upon the
question whether the negligence of the driver or manager of a
carriage is imputable to a passenger the authorities are conflictirg.
In the leading English case of Thorogoo v. Bryan, 8 C. B.
115, a passenger in alighting from an omnibus was thrown
down anl injured by the negligent management of another
omnibus, and it was held that an action could not be maintained against the owner of the latter if the driver of the omnibus in which the passenger was riding, by the exercise of proper
care and skill, might have avoided the accident which caused
the injury. Although this case has been criticised by English
judges, we are not aware that it has been overruled in the English courts; and in Arm-strong v. Railway Co., L. R. 10 Exch.
47, decided in 1875, it was followed and approved. In the latter case the plaintiff was injured by a collision of a train of the
London and Northwestern Railway Company, on which he was
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a passenger, with some coal cars of the defendant company.
The jury found that the collision was caused by the joint negligence of the London and Northwestern Company and the defendant; and it was held that the plaintiff was so far identified
with the London and Northwestern Company that he could not
recover: 12 Moak, Eng. R. 508.
In this country the doctrine of Thorogood v. Bryan has been
approved and followed in some States, and in others it has been
questioned and its soundness denied, and the weight of authority seems to be against it. Cases supporting it are found in
Wisconsin (oufe v. Fulton, 29 Wis. 296; Prideauxv. Mineral
Point,43 Wis. 513); in Pennsylvania (Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler,
46 Pa. St. 151; Forks Township v. King, 84 Pa. St. 230); in
Iowa (Payne v. Railroad Co., 39 Iowa 523); and in Vermont
(Carlisle v. Sheldon, 38 Vt. 440). Two Massachusetts cases
are cited as supporting the doctrine: Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick.
621, and Allyn v. Railroad Co., 105 Mass. 77. But all that
was decided in Smith v. Smith was that one who is injured by an
obstruction unlawfully placed in a highway cannot maintain an
action for damages if it appears that he did not use ordinary
care by which the obstruction might have been avoided; and
Allyn v. Railroad Co. merely decides that there was no evidence
for the jury that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care.
The question does not arise in highway cases in Massachusetts
and Maine, as 'it is there held that a town is not liable for an
injury caused by a defect of the highway and the negligent act
of a third party combined, the construction given to the statute
being that no action can be maintained unless the injury arises
wholly from the defect: Rowell v. Lowell, 7 Gray 100; Shepherd v. Chelsea, 4 Allen 113; Moulton v. Sanford, 51 Mc. 127;
Perkins v. Inhabitantsof Fayette, 68 Me. 152.
The doctrine of Thorogood v. Bryan is denied in New York
(Robinson v. Railroad Co., 66, N. Y. 11; Dyer v. Railway Co.,
71 N. Y. 228); in New Jersey (Bennet v. Railroad Co., 36 N.
J. Law 225; Railroad v. Steinbrenner, 47 N. J. Law 161,
171); in Ohio (Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 36 Ohio St. 86, 91); in
illinois (Railway Co. v. Shacklet, 105 Ill. 364); in Kentucky
(Turnpike Go. v. Stewart, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 119; Railroad Co. v.
Case's Adm'r, 9 Bush 728); in California (Tompkins v. Rail
VOL. XXXVI.-16
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road Co., 4 Pac. Rle). 1165); and in the Supreme Court of the
United States in the recent case of Little v. THeckctt, 116 U. S.
366.
The rule that the negligence of the driver or manager of a
vehicle is to be treated a- the negligence of a passenger, in an
action by the passenger against a third party, is put upon the
ground that the passenger, in selecting the conveyance, has
placed himself in the care of tile driver, and hence must be
taken to be in the same position; and the driver, as to third
persons, is to be so fIr regarded as the agent or servant of the
passenger as to make the latter chargeable with the driver's
negligence, and hence not entitled to recover, although he may
have been free from fault himself.
In Carlisle v. Sheldon, 38 Vt. 440, which was an action for
injury to a wife caused by a defect in the highway while riding
in a carriage driven by her husband, the doctrine is stated by
KELLOGG, J., as follows: "The question is whether a lack of
ordinary care and prudence on the part of the husband is in law,
under the circumstances of the clse, a bar to a recovery fbr an
injury to the wife when she herself was in the exercise of that
degree of care, and was in no fault whatever. The wife was
riding in a wagon drawn by a horse driven by her husband.
She was a passenger over the highway, and she stands in no
different position in respect to her rights as against the town
from that which she would occupy if the driver of the vehicle
in which she was carried had been, instead of her husband, one
employed for that purpose. Tile negligence or want of ordinary
care of her servant would have the same effect, and be attended
with the same legal consequences, which would follow from her
own negligence or want of care. If she had been a passenger
in a stage-coach on this occasion, and had received the same injury under precisely the same circumstances, although she might
have had a cause of action against tme proprietor for the negligence or want of care of the driver, we regard it as clear that
no action could have been maintained against the town, because
the proprietors and their driver would, in respeet to the town, be
treated as being her agents and servants, and their negligence or
want of ordinary care would be attended with the same consequences which would result from her own negligence and want of
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such care. Tile passenger would, in respect to the town, stand
upon the same footing that he would if he had himself been the
driver. There is nothing in the marital relation which would
change the situation of the wife in respect to her husband's
negligence under such circumstances; for the same consequences
would have followed if the relation, instead of being that of
husband and wife, h. d been that of parent and child, father and
daughter, or master and servant, or if she had been an entire
stranger, and had been carried by her husband as a passenger
gratuitously and without any expectation of reward. She was
under the care of her husband, who had the custody of her person and was responsible for her safety, and any want of ordinary care on his part is attributable to her in the same degree
as if she were wholly acting for herself."
On the other hand, this doctrine is declared to be unsound,
and in conflict with the principle that no one should be denied a
remedy for injuries sustained without fault by him or by a
party under his control or direction; that the relation of master
and servant or principal and agent does not exist in cases where
the passenger has no control over the driver; that it is the right
to control the conduct of the agent which is the foundation of
the doctrine that the master is to be affected by the acts of his
servant, and that no one is r-sponsible for the negligence of
another unless the latter is his servant or agent. In Robin-son
v. Railroad Co., 66 N. Y. 11, which was the case of a person
injured by a collision of the defendant's train of cars with a carriage in which the plaintiff was riding, by invitation of the
owner, who was driving, and whose negligence it was claimed
contributed to the injury, CauRcH, C. J., says: "The court
charged the jury that if the defendant was negligent, and the
plaintiff was free from negligence herself, she was entitled to recover, although the driver might be guilty of negligence which
contributed to the injury. In determining this question, it is
important to first ascertain the relation which existed between
the plaintiff and Conlon, the driver. It is very clear, and was
found by the jury, that the relation of master and servant did
not exist, nor was Conlon in any sense the agent of the plaintiff. * * * It is the case of a gratuitous ride by a female,
upon the invitation of the owner of the horse and carriage.
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The plaintiff had no control of the vehicle, nor of the driver in
its management. It is not claimed but that Conlon was an
able-bodied, competent person to manage the establishment, nor
that he was intoxicated or in any way unfit to have charge of
it. Upon what principle is it that his negligence is inputable
to the plaintiff? It is conceded that, if by his negligence he
had injured a third person, she would not be liable. She was
not responsible for his acts, and had no right and no power to
control them. True, she had consented to ride with him, but,
as he was in every way competent and suitable, she was not
negligent in doing so. Can she be held, by consenting to ride
with him, to guaranty his perfect care and diligence? There
was no necessity for riding with him; it was a voluntary act on
the part of the plaintiff, but it was not an unlawful
or negligent act. She was injured by the negligence of a third
person, and was free from negligence herself; and I am unable
to perceive any reason for imputing Conlon's negligence to her.
* * * It is no excuse for the negligence of the defendant
that another person's negligence contributed to the injury, for
whose acts the plaintiff was not re3ponsible."
Bennett v. Transportation Co., 36 N. J. Law 225, was the
case of a passenger in a horse-car injured by the negligent management of a locomotive by tile defendant's engineer, and it was
held no defense to show contributory negligence in the driver of
the horse-car. In delivering the opinion of the court, BEASLEY,
C. J., said : "The proposition claimed to be law is that, when
a passenger enters a pul)lic conveyance, he in some sort becomes
affected by the negligence of the agents of those in charge of
such conveyance-it least, to the extent of debarring him from.
suits against third parties for injuries occasioned by the joint
carelessness of such third parties and that of the servants having
the control of the vehicle in which lie is riding. This position
has for its support the case of Thorogood v. Bryan. The authority is in every respect in point. * * * The reason given
for the judgment is that the passenger in the omnibus must be
considered as identified with the driver of the omnibus in which
he voluntarily becomes a passenger, and that the negligence of
the driver is the negligence of the passenger. But I have
entirely failed to perceive how it is that the passenger in a public
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conveyance becomes identified, in any legal sense, with the
driver of such conveyance. Such identification could only restilt in one way; that is, by considering such driver the servant
of the passenger. I can see no ground upon which such a relationship is to be founded. In a practical point of view, it certainly does not exist. The passenger has no control over the
driver or agent in charge of the vehicle; and it is the right to
control the conduct of the agent wlich is the foundation of the
doctrine that the master is to be affected by the acts of his servant. To hold that the conductor of a street car or of a railroad
train is the agent of the numerous passengers who may chance
to be in it would be a positive fiction. In reality, there is no
such agency; and if we impute it, and correctly apply legal principles, the passenger, on the occurrence of an accident from the
carelessness of the person in charge of the vehicle in which he is
being conveyed, would be witfiout any remedy. It is obvious,
in a suit against the proprietor of a car in which he was a passenger, there could be no remedy if the driver or conductor of
such car is to be regarded as the servant of the passenger. And
so, on the same ground, each passenger would be liable to every
person injured by the carelessness of each driver or conductor,
because, if the negligence of such agent is to be attributed to the
passenger for one purpose, it would be entirely arbitrary to say
that he is not to be affected by it for other purposes."
The recent case of Little v. Hackett, in the Supreme Court of
the United States, was the case of a person hiring a public back
and injured by a collision of the hack and a railway train,
caused by the negligence of both the managers of the train and
the driver of the hack, over whom the passenger exercised no
control except in directing where he wished to be conveyed.
Speaking for the court, Mr. Justice FIELD said: "Cases cited
from the English courts, as we have seen, and numerous others
decided in the courts of this country, show that the relation of
master and servant does not exist between the passenger
and the driver, or between the passenger and the owner.
In the absence of this relation, the imputation of their negligence, when no fault of omission or commission is chargeable
to him, is against all legal rules. If their negligence could
be imputed to him, it would render him, equally with them,
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responsible to third parties thereby injured, and would also preclude him from maintaining an action against the owners Jbr
inljuries received by reason of it. But neither of these conclusions
can be maintained ; neither has the support of any adjudged
cases entitled to consideration. The truth is, the decision in
T1iorogood v. Bryant rests upon indefensible ground. The
identification of the passenger with the negligent driver or the
owner without his personal co-operation or encouragement i.; a
gratuitous assumption. There is no such identity. The parties
are not in the samo position. The owner ofa public conveyance
is a carrier, and the driver or person managing it is his servant.
Neither of them is the servant of the passenger, and his asserted
identity with them is contradicted by the daily experience of the
world. * * * There is no distinction, in principle, whether
the passenger be on a public conveyance, like a railroad train or
an omnibus, or be on a hack hired from a public stan,1 in the
street for a drive. Those on a hack do not become responsible
for the negligence of the driver if they exereise no control over
him further than to indimte the route which they wish to travel,
or the places to which they wish to go. If he is their agent so
that his negligence can be imputed to them to prevent their recovery against a third party, lie must be their agent in all other
respects, so far as the management of the carriage is concerned
and responsibility to third parties would attach to them for injuries caused by his negligence in the course of his employment.
But, as we have already stated, responsibility cannot, within any
recognized rules of law, be fastened upon one who has in no
way interfered with and controlled in the matter causing the
injury. From the simple fact of hiring the carriage, or riding in
it, no such liability can arise. The party hiring or riding must
in some way have co-operated in producing the injury complained of before he incurs any liability for it :" Little v.
flackett, 116 U. S. 366, 374, 375, 379.
These remarks apply with equal force to the case of a person
hiring a passage in a private conveyance or accepting a gratuitous invitation to ride in the carriage of another. The foregoing are actions by passengers injured by the negligence of the
driver or manager of the conveyance in which they were riding,
coupled with the negligence of the managers of another public
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conveyance; but there is no distinction in principle between
them and the case of a passenger in a private carriage injured
by the negligence of the driver and a defect in the highway.
The question whether the negligence of the driver, over whom
a passenger has no control, is a bar to an action by the passenger
for injuries caused by an insufficient highway, has never been
directly raised or determined in this State. It has sometimes
been assumed, without being questioned, that tho passenger was
responsible for the driver's care. The question can only arise
in cases where the passenger has no authority or control over
the driver, and where the relation of master and servant or principal and agent does not exist between the passenger and driver.
It does not arise in an action by the owner of a team injured by
a defective highway while in the possession and control of a
bailee. Property cannot of itself exercise care or be guilty of
negligence. It has no rights or duties independent of the owner;
and as towns are liable for damages happening to travelers only,
the owner of a team injured by a defective highway, to recover
against the town, must show that at the time of the injury it
was being used for traveling purposes, and managed with reasonable care, and therefore the owner is bound by the degree of
care exercised by the party to whom he has intrusted the care of
his property. To recover for a personal injury, a traveler must
show that he was personally exercising due care; and to recover
for an injury to property, it must appear that the property was
used and managed with due care at the time the injury was
received. Hence cases for injury to a horse or carriage in the
control of a bailee, like Norris v. Litchfield, 35 N. H. 271;
Cammings v. Center Harbor,57 N. H. 17; and Stark v. Lanaster, Id. 88-are not authority for the doctrine that a passenger, personally exercising due care, is necessarily chargeable
with the negligence of the driver or manager of the vehicle
in which he was riding.
Intheabsenceof anyrelation of master and servant, or principal
and agent, when each is independent of control by the other,
why should a passenger be chargeable with the driver's negligence, any more than the driver with the passenger's negligence?
In traveling in the night, an obstruction in the highway,
unknown to the driver, but known to a passenger, causes an
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injury to both. By informing the driver, the accident would
have been avoided, and the passenger was chargeable with negligence in failing to give the information. The passenger cannot
recover. Would his negligence preclude the driver, who was in
no fault, from recovering? A traveler on foot is responsible
only for his own negligence. Why should a traveler in a carriage be held responsible, not only for his own negligence, but
also for the negligence of a driver over whom he has no control?
It is contended that towns are only required to keep their highways safe for careful driving, and therefore a passenger is
necessarily affected by the driver's negligence. There is no
absolute legal test of the sufficiency of a highway. Like the
question whether a person is a traveler upon the highway,
it is ordinarily a question of fact: I'arney v. .01anelicster,58 N.
I. 430. A highway is not required to be entered free from
defects, but it must be suitable for the travel thereon. Gen.
Laws, c. 75, § 1. It must be reasonably safe. But it cannot
be said, as matter of law, that a highway sufficient with a safe
horse, carriage, and driver, is a reasonably safe highway; nor
that a highway, to be reasonably safe, must be sufficient to
prevent accidents with a vicious horse, a defective carriage, or
a careless driver.
The fact that an injury to a traveler on a highway was caused
by the combined effect of the unsafe condition of the road and
the negligence of a third person is no defense to the party who
is bound to keep the highway in repair: Shear. & R. Neg. ;
lrinship v. Enfidd, 42 N. H. 197; Norris v. Litchfield, 35 Id.
271; Cooley, Torts, 684. A traveler is required to exercise
reasonable care in the use of a highway, in the selection of his
horse, harness, and carriage; and if he exercises such care, the
fact that the vices of the horse, or defects in the harness or
carriage, may have concurred with the unsafe condition of the
highway in causing an injury, is no defense to the town: Clark
v. Barrington, 41 N. H. 44; Tucker v. Henniker, Id. 317.
In harmony with this rule, and upon principle, we think that a
traveler should be held to the exercise of reasonable care only
in the selection of a driver; and being in no fault in the choice
of his conveyance, and having no control over the management
of the team, lie should not be held responsible for the negligence
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of the driver, which lie could not reasonably anticipate or prevent. In Plummer v. Ossipee, 59 N. H. 55, which was an
action by a wife for injuries from an obstruction in a highway
while riding with her husband, the defendant claimed that the
husband was a fast and careless driver, and introduced in evidence particular instances of his fast and careless driving, and,

subject to exception, the plaintiff was permitted to testify to
other instances of his careful driving when she had been riding
with him; and it was held that the evidence was relevant to the
husband's character for driving safely or otherwise, and *as
also relative to the question of the plaintiff's negligence in
selecting a suitable driver on the occasion of the accident.
In this view the instructions to the jury as to the plaintiff's
responsibility for Dearborn's negligence should have been qualifled. If the plaintiff was in no fault in riding with Dearborn,
and in no way controlled or culd control his management of
the team, she was not responsible for his negligence.
CmAP.NTER,

J., did not sit. The others concurred.

CLARK, J.--Since the announcement of the foregoing opinion,
and pending a motion for a rehearing, which, after reargument,
was denied, the cases of Thorogood v. Bryan and Aimstrong v.
Railway Co., have been overruled in the English Court of Appeal, in the case of The Bernina, 12 Prob. Div. 58.
In delivering his judgment., after an extended review of the
English and American cases, Lord ESHER, M. R., said: "After
having thus laboriously inquired into the matter, and having
considered the case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115, we
cannot see any principle on which it can be supported; and we
think that, with the exception of the weighty observation of
Lord BRAmWELL, though that does not seem to be a final view,
the preponderance of judicial and professional opinion in England is against it, and that the weight of judicial opinion in
America is also against it. We are of opinion that the proposition maintained in it is essentially unjust and iuconsistent with
other recognized propositions of law. As to the propriety of
dealing with it at this time in a court of appeals, it is a ease
which, from the time of its publication, has been constantly
VoL XXXVI.-17
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criticised. No one can have gone into, or have abstained from
going into, an onuibus, railroad, or ship onl tile faith of the decision. We therefore think that, now that the question is for the
first time before an English court of appeal, the case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115, must be overruled."
LINDLEY, J., Said: "The doctrine of identification laid down
in Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115, is to me quite unintelligible. It is in truth a fictitious extension of the principles of
agency. But to say that the driver of a public conveyance is
the agent of the passengers is to say that which is not true in
fact. Such a doctrine, if made the basis of further reasoning,
leads to results which are wholly untenable; e. g., to the result
that tile passengers would be liable for the negiigence of the person driving them, which is obviously absurd, but which, of
course, the court never ,ueant. All the court meant to say was
that, for purposes of suing for negligence, the passenger was in
no better position than the man driving him. But why not?
The driver of a public vehicle is not selected by the passenger
otherwise than by being hailed by him, as one of the public, to
take him up; and such selection, if selection it can be called,
does not create the relation of principal and agent, or master
and servant, between the passenger and the driver. The passenger knows nothing of the driver, and has no control over
him; nor is the driver in any proper sense employed by the
passenger."
Lopi.:s, J., said: "What is meant by tile passenger being
'identified with the carriage,' or 'with the person having its
mana(rement,' I am at a loss to understand. In Arntronq v.
_ailway Co., L. R. 10 Exeh. 47, POLLOCK, B., said he understood it to mean 'that the plaintif for the purposes of the action,
must be taken to be in the same position as the owner of the
omnibus or his driver.' If that is the true explanation, then
tile passenger, who is blameless, is to be in the same position as
the driver, who committed a wrongful act, or his master, who is
responsible for the negligence of his servant. This is in accordance neither with good sense nor justice. * * * The more
tho decision in Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115, is examined,
the more anomalous and indefensible that decision appears. The
theory of tile identification of tile passengers with the negligent
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driver or owner is, in my opinion, a fallacy and a fiction contrary to sound law and opposed to every principle of justice.
A passenger in an omnibus, whose injury is caused by the joint
negligence of that omnibus and another, may, in my opinion,
maintain an action, either against the owner of the omnibus in
which lie was carried, or the other omnibus, or both. I am
clearly of opinion that Tkorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115, should
be overruled :" 57 Amer. Rep. 483, 494, 507, 508, 510.
The rule of the principal case is
eminently just, and rests upon the
soundest reason and common sense.
For some years there has been much
diversity of opinion as to the right
determination of the principle involved, especially in England, resulting from the rule of T/horogood v.
Bryan, 8 C. B. 115, decided nearly
forty years ago. The doctrine of that
case of the "anomalous identification" of driver and passenger has been
severely criticised by English judges
ever since its announcement, until
finally the Court of Appeals has expressly overruled it: The Bernina, 12
Prob. Div. 58. This action has been
highly commended by the English
legal press. In a recent number of
the London Law Times the decision
is thus received: "The doctrine laid
down in Tlorogood v. Bryan, that a

passenger in a public conveyance, injured by the negligent management
of another conveya'ice, cannot maintain an action against the owner of
the latter, if the driver of the former,
by the exercise of proper care and
skill, might have avoided the accident, has at length been overruled.
The ground upon which the court, in
Tlwrogood v. Bryan, based this start-

ling proposition was, that the passenger in selecting a vehicle so identifies
himself with its owner, and therefore
with its driver, that the negligence of
the driver is to be considered as the
negligence of the passenger himself.

Starting from this assumption, the
court not unnaturally came to the
conclusion that the rights of the passenger against the owner of the other
vehicle were restricted so as to deprive him of any right of action. The
Court of Appeals failed to find any
ground for the assumption. Thepassenger has no control over the driver,
he cannot control his movements, and
is, in fact, powerless to prevent his
negligence. As the Court of Appeals
points out, if the passenger is so identified with the driveras to be deemed
to be guilty of negligence, and therefore deprived of a right of action, it
must necessarily follow that, in addition to his rights being curtailed, his
liabilities are correspondingly enlarged, and the result is that every
passenger in an omnibus or other
public conveyance is necessarily
liable to third parties for the negligence of the driver. The absurdity
and injustice of such a doctrine are so
ODvious as not to need observation."
The doctrine of Thorogoodv. Bryan
has met with but little favor in ti.is
country. Here it has many times
been expressly condemned by courts
of the highest authority as a gross anil
manifestly absurd doctrine, wholly
devoid of justice, reason, or common
sense. Yet a few courts of last resort
have, in a manner, embraced the doctrine. In this connection see note in
24 Am. Law Reg. 710, 716, to St.
Clair.d. Co. v..Eadie, 43 Ohio St.
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91; s.c. 23 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.
269, where the result of the cases up
to that time is fully stated.
Illustrations will be drawn from the
more recent cases.
Public Coanveyances.-Tn Gray v.
Philada., etc., Rd. Co. (C. C. N. D.
N. Y.), 24 Fed. Rep. 168, it is held
that where a fireman on a railroad
train is injured by a collision at a
crossing of two roads, caused by the
concurring negligence of the engineer
on his train and of the employee of
tile other road, his right to recover
damages for such injury from the other
road will not be defeated by reason of
the negligence of the engineer. The
court in giving the opinion observed:
"Although the plaintiff was a fellowservant of the engineer, he wes a
subordinate, and had no control over
the movement of the locomotive. If
lie was not guilty of any person'al
negligence, and did not countenance
the negligent conduct of his fellowservant, upon reason, and according
to the weight of authority, he ought
not to be precluded from a recovery
againstthe defendant. * * * Upon
the facts found by the jury he was no
more accountable for the missonduct
of- the engineer than a passenger
would be, or than the owner of a
cargo would be for the negligent acts
of the carrier whom he has employed
to transport his property."
The recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court, cited in Little v.
iTacke, 116 U. S. 66; s.c. 54 Am.
Rep. 135, is a valuable contribution
to this class of legal literature. In
that case the plaintiff hired a public
hack and gave directions to the driver
-s to the place to which he wished to
be carried, but exercised no other
control over the conduct of the driver.
It was held that he was not responsible for the acts of negligence of such
driver, nor was lie prevented from re-

covering against a railroad company
for injuries suffered from a collision of
its train with the hack, caused by the
negligence of bath the manager of the
train and of the driver. Mr. Justice
FiE:LD, who delivered the opinion,
thoroughly reviews the authorities
and gives most cogent reasons for a
-rejection of the rule of Thorogood v.
Bryan.
Malrsten v. Rd. Co., 49 Mich. 94,
holds that a passenger who has
just landed from a steamboat is not so
identified with the steamboat company as to make the company solely
liable for an injury suffered by the
passenger by thenegligence of a third
person immediately thereafter; relying npon Guddy v. Horn, 46 Mich.
596, which holds that the rule by
which one who rides in a private conveyance is presumed to control or be
identified with the driver and to have
no right of action for an injury done
him by a collision caused by the
driver's negligence, cannot apply to
passengers in public conveyances,
even though they have chartered the
conveyance. In Tompkims v. Clay
Street Rd. Cb., 66 Cala. 163, the plaintiff was injured by the collision of
two street cars caused by the concurring negligence of the managers of the
respective cars. It was held that he
might recover against either or both.
Private Conveyances.- Three Wisconsin cases have sustained a distinction between public and private
conveyances as to the point underreview, and have declared the rule that
where the injured person is riding by
invitation of the driver, the latter is
the agent of the former, and the
driver's negligence is imputable to
such person: .Prideauz v. .Mineral
P'oint, 43 Wis. 513,526;
foue
v. Fulton, 29 Id. 296; Otis v. Janesville, 47
Id. 422. This distinction has also
been adopted in Michigan: Lake
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by the English. courts were expressly
Shore, etc, Rd. Co. v. Miller. 25 Mich.
rejected. In the late case of Borough
orm, 46 Id.
274, 287; C'uddy v.
& of Carlisev. Brisbane, 113 Pa. St. 546;
596, and Iowa: Payne v. . B.
s. c. 57 Am. Rep. 483 (with note),
P..Rd., 39 Iowa 523. A New York
the court hods that one who isincase, Brown v. .V. Y. Cent. Rd., 31
Barb. 385, also adopted it. but later
jured by thejoint negligence of a percases rejected it: robinson v. N. Y. & son with whom he is riding by invitation, and a third person, is not
HRB. Rd. Co, 66N. Y. 11; Dyer v.
chargeable with the negligence of the
Erie, etc., Rd. C., 71 Id. 228. In a
recent case in the United States Cir- driver. In course of the opinion, the
court said: "Where a passenger is
cuit Court for the Northern District
of Iowa, SHiRAs, D. J., charged the personally injured by the joint negligence of his carrier and another parjury that the negligence of the driver
ty, his remedy is against the carrier
of a private carriage in crossing a
alone. The question was first raised
railroad is the negligence of the occuin this court, and was very fully dispants: Morrisv. Bd. Co., 26 Fed. Rep.
cussed in the case of Lockhart v. Lich22. See Slater v. B. C. R. & I. Rd.
tenther,46 Pa. St. 151. The decision
C.P., 71 Iowa.
in that case was grounded upon the
In other States a more reasonable
rule has been adopted. In Fallnsan v.' doctrine of the English cases: Bridge
v. Grand JunctionB. Co., 3 M. & IV.
City of Mankato, 35 Minn. 522, the
247, in the Court of Exchequer;
question presented was whether one
Tihorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115 (C
who, by invitation or permission of
Eng. Co. Law), and Cattlin v. Hills, 65
another, rides in the private conveyEng. Com. Law 123, in the Common
ance of the latter, and which is wholly
Bench. These cases have since been
under the management and control
followed and approved in the Exof the owner, is affected by the neglichequer by Armstrongv. Lancasterand
gence of such owner so as to prevent
York . Co., L. R. 10 Exch. 47. The
a recovery against a third party for
principle upon which all these Engnegligence? The court answered in
lish cases appear to have been deterthe negative, citing and relying upon
mined is that the passenger is so far
Robinson v. Rd. Co., 66 N.Y. 11; Dyer v. Rd. Co., 71 N.Y. 228; Masterson identified with the carriage in which
be is traveling, that want of care on
v. Rd. Co., 84 Id. 247; Little v.
the part of the driver will be a deHackett, 116 United States 366; Benfense of the owner of the other carvett v. Rd. Co., 36 N. J. L. 225; R. B.
Co. v. Slcinbrenner, 47 Id. 161; Caddy riage that directly caused the injury.
v. Horne, 46 Mich. 596; Transfer Co. Our own case of Lockhart v. Lichtenv. Kelly, 36 Ohio St. 86; Rd. Co. v. thaler, supra, was followed by Pd. Co.
v. Boyer, 97 Pa. St. 91, an action
,Shackle4 105 111.365. See Phila. etc.,
against a railroad company to recover
Rd. Co. v. Hogdand, 66 Md. 149, for
damages for the death of a person
an interesting recent case.
caused by a collision of defendants
The Pennsylvania doctrine israther
peculiar, and the reasons given by the train with a street car, in which the
deceased was a passenger. It was held
Supreme Court of that State to supthat in order to recover, the plaintiff
port it are not easily comprehended.
must show, not only that the death
v.
Bryan
Thorogood
While the rule of
resulted directly from the defendant's
seems to have been adopted, yet,
negligence, but that the negligence of
given
it,
the
reasons
while adopting
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the carrier company (lid not contribute to the injury. Therefore, although
there is certainly a wide difference of
opinion between the courts of this
and other States on the subject, it
seems to be well settled as the law of
Pennsylvania that the remedy of a
passenger injured by the joint negligence of his carrier and another is
against the common carrier only.
The reasons for this rule are given in
Lockhart v. Licdtenthaler, supra, by
Tito iPsoN, J., as follows. "I would
say the reason for it, that it better
accords with the policy of the law to
hold the carrier alone responsible in
such circumstances as an incentive to
care and diligence. As the law fixes
the responsibility upon a ditterent
principle in case of carriers, -asalready
noticed, from that of a party who
does not stand in that relation to the
injured party, the very philosophy of
the requirement of greater care is
that he shall be answerable for omitting any duty which the law has defined as his rule and guide, and will
not permit him to escape by imputing

negligence of a less culpable character to others, but sufficient to render
them liable for the consequences of
hisown. ]t would be altogether more
just to hold liable him who has engaged to observe the highest degrt e
of diligence and care and has been
compensated for doing it, rather than
upon him upon whom no such obligation rests, and who, not being compensated for the observance of such a degree of care, acts only on the duty to
observe ordinary care, and may not
be aware even of the presence of a
party who might be injured. This rule,
it cannot be doubted, will be more
likely to increase diligence than the
opposite, which would enable a negligent and faithless party to escape the
consequences of his want of care by
swearing it on another, which he
would assuredly do if the temptation
and opportunity aflbrded. As thliview accords best with the pollcy of
the law, it is proof of the existence
of the rule itself."
B. E. BLACK.
St. Louis, Mo.

